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I. INTRODUCTION 
The burgeoning caseload of the U.S. courts of appeals, which has 
risen more rapidly than has the number of appellate judges, has caused a 
problem for these mandatory jurisdiction courts. As they must rule on all 
appeals brought to them, even if the issues are elementary and the 
answers obvious, what should they do? To aid in coping with their 
caseload, for close to thirty years they have issued memorandum 
dispositions and orders which are not to be cited as precedent, although 
they could be cited for purposes related to “law of the case.” There is 
now a movement to allow their citation not as precedent but in efforts to 
persuade the court.3 Because initially they were not published in the 
reporters, they came to be called “unpublished” dispositions; however, 
for some time, they have been available on Westlaw and on court 
                                                                                                             
 3 Proposed Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure would remove 
any prohibition or restriction on the citation of unpublished opinions. In August 2003, the 
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules had published the rule for comment, and had 
recommended approval and transmission of the proposal to the Judicial Conference. In 
June 2004, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure postponed action on the 
new rule so that the Federal Judicial Center could complete research on some matters 
raised by the proposed Rule’s opponents, who were concentrated in the Ninth Circuit.  
For an account, see How Appealing, http://www.legalaffairs.org/howappealing/2004_ 
06_01_appellateblog_archive.html#108793216008620 (June 22, 2004, 15:22 EST) 
(Howard Bashman). That study, Tim Reagan et al., Citations to Unpublished Opinions in 
the Federal Courts of Appeals (June 1, 2005), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/ 
pdf.nsf/lookup/Citatio2.pdf/$File/Citatio2.pdf, was completed in June 2005, and, after the 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure approved the new Rule, in September 
2005 the Judicial Conference endorsed the rule change and forwarded the new rule to 
Congress. See Tony Mauro, Judicial Conference Supports Citing Unpublished Opinions, 
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 
1127207112718. 
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websites and, more recently, have been published in West’s Federal 
Appendix.4 
The frequent use of such dispositions, which now constitute more 
than three-fourths of all courts of appeals rulings,5 has led to 
considerable rhetoric about whether or not they should be used; indeed, 
the level of controversy may be said to exceed the amount of knowledge 
held even by many of those who use the federal appellate courts. It is 
now long past time for systematic attention to the actuality of practices in 
the circuits leading to unpublished dispositions. Whether dispositions 
become published opinions or unpublished memorandums is a result of 
actions by the judges, clerks, and parties who prepare them and the 
process through which they move, including discussion among the 
judges on a panel as to the type of disposition that should result; attention 
has been given to that process elsewhere.6 To assist greater 
understanding of “unpublished” dispositions, this article offers some 
empirical groundwork about the guidelines that have been created to 
determine whether judges should produce either a published opinion or 
an unpublished disposition; that groundwork is necessary if people are to 
evaluate proposals for changing the rules concerning their use. Included 
are the circumstances in which unpublished dispositions are used, the 
guidelines for publication, their enforcement, compliance with those 
guidelines, and other norms concerning non-publication. 
This article provides information about judges’ views on an 
important aspect of the process by which they make decisions, as well as 
a partial view of interaction among judges as they reach a final product. 
Receiving principal attention is the process in the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, although some examples are drawn from other 
circuits. What takes place in the Ninth Circuit can be taken as indicative 
of what happens elsewhere because, despite minor procedural variations 
from one circuit to the next, basic elements of the process are similar 
across circuits, as are the formal criteria for publication. One important 
                                                                                                             
 4 The term “unpublished” dispositions, although now a misnomer, is used here 
because it has long been standard terminology, although it is now “no more than a 
shorthand for opinions that are designated by the court as ‘not for publication,’” 
Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 3 
(2002) (Statement of Arthur Hellman, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School 
of Law) [hereinafter Hellman statements]. 
 5 See Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States 
Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRACT. & PROCESS 199, 201 (2001). 
 6 See Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals: 
Making the Decision to Publish, 3 J. APP. PRACT. & PROCESS 325 (2001); Stephen L. 
Wasby, Unpublished Court of Appeals Decisions: A Hard Look at the Process, 14 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67 (2004). 
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difference, however, is that Ninth Circuit memorandum dispositions are 
written text — not the one-line “Affirmed - see Rule 36-1” dispositions 
common in, for example, the Third and Eleventh Circuits — and the 
object of considerable criticism. 
The picture presented here is drawn from not-for-publication 
dispositions from the late 1970s to the present time;7 discussions with 
some judges; files in closed cases; and the author’s extended observation 
of the functioning of the Ninth Circuit. Material from the files is used to 
provide examples for each of the elements examined. Because those files 
contain clerks’ work and judges’ communications with each other during 
consideration of a case, they provide a more complete understanding of 
why cases are published or not published.8 
The article begins with discussion of the guidelines themselves and 
related norms concerning non-publication; approaches to evaluating 
compliance with the guidelines and norms; and how the guidelines might 
be enforced. Each of the Ninth Circuit’s guidelines are discussed in turn, 
followed by treatment of other norms and considerations affecting 
publication that have been identified. Receiving particular attention are 
dispositions containing issues of first impression, those with separate 
opinions, and those reversing the lower court or agency. 
A. Guidelines 
Judges’ decisions whether to publish are largely, but not 
completely, discretionary. The criteria or guidelines in each court of 
appeals’ Local Rules, which once spoke of when a decision must be 
published but now speak of when they may be published, are permissive 
rather than mandatory although they remain formal. They are also 
relatively consistent across circuits in their wording although they “differ 
somewhat in their application.”9 
                                                                                                             
 7 Unpublished dispositions for 1972 through 1977 were examined in the San 
Francisco library of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; these dispositions 
predated even the inclusion of Federal Reporter lists of such cases, and thus do not bear 
“F.2d” citations. 
 8 Reliance on the papers of a single judge poses the risk of lack of 
representativeness, and, through quotation, certainly leads to greater prominence to that 
judge’s views. However, as any one judge sits with many other combinations of judges 
over time, these multiple interactions should serve to provide a breadth of views and 
reveal recurring patterns. 
 9 JUDITH A. MCKENNA, LAURAL L. HOOPER & MARY CLARK, CASE MANAGEMENT 
PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 18 (Federal Judicial Center, 2000). 
State courts have also enunciated criteria for publication or non-publication of 
dispositions. See Arthur G. Scotland, The Filing and Publication of Appellate Opinions: 
A Survey of the Council of Chief Judges of Courts of Appeal, JUDGES’ J. 31 (Winter 
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The criteria state when cases should be published, not when they 
should not be published. The Ninth Circuit’s General Orders (G.O. 4.3)10 
say an opinion should be written only if the panel determines that a 
published opinion is necessary, and according to Ninth Circuit Rule 36-2, 
a disposition should be published only if it: 
(a) Establishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule of law, or 
(b) Calls attention to a rule of law which appears to have been 
generally overlooked, or 
(c) Criticizes existing law, or 
(d) Involves a legal or factual issue of unique interest or 
substantial public importance, or 
(e) Is a disposition of a case in which there is a published opinion 
by a lower court or administrative agency, unless the panel 
determines that publication is unnecessary for clarifying the 
panel’s disposition of the case, or 
(f) Is a disposition of a case following a reversal or remand by 
the United States Supreme Court, or 
(g) Is accompanied by a separate concurring or dissenting 
expression, and the author of such separate expression requests 
publication of the disposition of the Court and the separate 
expression.11 
The elements of this Rule have remained quite stable over time; 
exceptions are the additions of (c) and (f) to what was the Ninth Circuit’s 
Rule 21(b) of twenty years ago. 
These guidelines, while providing the context within which judges 
make decisions whether or not to publish, are not “the whole story.” For 
one thing, “[f]or many courts the written rules do not reflect the actual 
standards used by the court.”12 Other, unstated norms or desiderata also 
                                                                                                             
2004), which distinguishes between criteria to publish, id. at 31, or to use memorandum 
dispositions, id. at 33. 
 10  U.S. CT. OF APP. 9TH CIR. GEN. ORDER 4.3 (2005), available at http://www.ca9.us 
courts.gov/ca9/Documents.nsf/54dbe3fb372dcb6c8825ce50065fcb8/f769f3ad364d1b6d8
8256864007a1479?OpenDocument. 
 11 9TH CIR. R. 36-2.  
 12 DONNA STIENSTRA, UNPUBLISHED DISPOSITIONS: PROBLEMS OF ACCESS AND USE IN 
THE COURTS OF APPEALS 37 (Federal Judicial Center, 1985). 
46 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 2:041 
come into play, and there are factors shown to be related to choice of an 
unpublished disposition. 
Among the norms are that rulings on non-final/non-dispositive 
matters, those based on sufficiency of the evidence, and those based on 
state law such as cases coming to the federal courts under its diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction need not be published. In such situations, one can 
talk of courts that are “reported to have adopted such a policy in 
practice,” as was the case with the Ninth Circuit and intercircuit conflict 
cases.13 Norms are, however, not as closely followed as rules, and the 
pattern of compliance is even less clear for “constructed” criteria. Some 
of these norms and factors are easily identifiable, perhaps because, like 
publication of reversals, they are part of other circuits’ formal rules, 
while others are categories an observer can construct where use of 
unpublished dispositions is sufficiently regular to allow an inference of 
the presence of an implicit norm.          
B. Evaluating Use 
That the guidelines are not self-executing and that compliance with 
them is less than complete is evident in claims that there is inconsistency 
among unpublished dispositions and in research findings that there is 
considerable slippage in the application of criteria.14 However, we must 
go beyond such general statements to a closer examination of 
unpublished dispositions, in which our concern is with those cases 
resolved by unpublished memorandum when publication might seem 
appropriate. We adopt this focus on unpublished dispositions rather than 
published ones because one does not read criticism of over-publication; 
instead there is criticism of overuse of unpublished dispositions.15 This 
makes a “violation” in the direction of not publishing perhaps more 
serious than publication when the criteria for publication are not met. It 
may be easier to question the wisdom of the decision to publish than to 
determine that an unpublished disposition should have been published; a 
brief memorandum disposition may mask information that would lead to 
the conclusion that publication was in order. There is little dispute that 
many individual cases are extremely clear-cut candidates for unpublished 
                                                                                                             
 13 Id. at 36 (emphasis added). 
 14 See Donald R. Songer, Danna Smith & Reginald S. Sheehan, Nonpublication in 
the Eleventh Circuit: An Empirical Analysis, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 963 (1989); Donald 
R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Formal 
Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307 (1990). 
 15 See, e.g., William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and 
the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 
281-86 (1996). 
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disposition. Beyond them, however, evaluating unpublished rulings is 
harder, and when judges say virtually nothing, determining whether non-
publication is proper is very difficult. 
Some people appear to approach evaluation of unpublished 
dispositions with an apparent presumption that all dispositions should be 
published and a stance that every decision not to publish is 
questionable.16 Some also seem to hold the further belief that judges, 
acting in malign fashion, use memorandum dispositions to hide 
intracircuit inconsistency and perhaps as well to avoid hard choices.17 
Those claims of impropriety are usually based on individual instances 
without an indication of how frequently that type of problem occurs, and 
claims that dispositions in unpublished rulings are not really reasoned 
dispositions18 seem designed to put in question the whole enterprise of 
using unpublished dispositions. An alternative approach, used in this 
article, treats judges’ decisions to issue not-for-publication dispositions 
as having been undertaken in good faith, with the judges having made 
some effort to provide reasons, if not full-blown disquisitions, to 
litigants. Instead, decisions to publish or not are evaluated in terms of the 
guidelines the courts themselves create and the norms they have 
developed, as it is legitimate to ask how those criteria appear to be 
applied. 
C. Enforcement 
Before turning to look at particular criteria, we ask how the criteria 
might be enforced. The court’s staff attorneys could play a role in 
uncovering intracircuit conflicts that exist in unpublished dispositions 
and could prompt the judges to resolve the conflict. On case inventory 
sheets, the staff attorneys note prior memorandum dispositions on the 
question in the present case, and they may further recommend that the 
panel publish the present case. From time to time, courts have charged 
staff attorneys with examining not-for-publication dispositions before 
they are filed to see if they fit the criteria and to recommend the 
publication of dispositions they feel are erroneously designated “not for 
publication.” 
However, not only do staff attorneys’ workloads give them little 
time for this oversight function, but it is also possible that they are 
hesitant to call possible errors to the judges’ attention or that judges 
                                                                                                             
 16 See id.; see also William M. Richman, An Argument on the Record for More 
Federal Judgeships, 1 J. APP. PRACT. & PROCESS 37 (1999). 
 17 See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 157 (1998). 
 18 See id. at 163 n.24. 
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ignore their suggestions, reinforcing such hesitancy. Indeed, some judges 
have suggested that colleagues are unlikely to respond favorably to 
publication suggestions from (mere) staff attorneys. This view is evident 
in a memorandum from a judge to colleagues reporting that a disposition 
had not been filed “because the staff decided that under our rules an 
opinion is required” and noting that the staff “seem to have overruled the 
panel majority.”19 Although this judge had earlier argued unsuccessfully 
within the panel for publication, he said, “I hope the staff loses . . . 
because I think that judges’ views should prevail”; he later reported that 
“the clerk lost in the fight” on that case.20 
Perhaps the most important way to enforce the criteria in a multi-
member court, short of appointing a “Publication Rules Czar,” is for 
judges to remind each other of their application in particular cases. That 
the criteria for publication appear to be followed to a large extent even in 
the absence of an enforcement officer may result from several factors. 
There is discussion among panel members at post-argument conference 
as to whether the disposition ought to be published. Panel members 
examining a proposed disposition are not hesitant to call to the attention 
of the writing judge that publication is required because, for example, no 
in-circuit citations have been used. There is also monitoring by off-panel 
judges who might suggest to the panel that they publish a particular 
memorandum disposition. However, judges are less likely to monitor 
other judges’ unpublished dispositions than their published opinions, 
evident in a judge’s interview comment that there are “unpublished 
dispositions that fly under the radar of the rest of the court.”21 In 
addition, as they join the court,22 new judges absorb the pattern 
established with respect to the types of dispositions that are to be 
published. This socialization process is repeated within the community of 
clerks, as departing clerks convey to their successors information about 
the types of information they will prepare and as the new clerks 
themselves read prior dispositions in their judge’s chambers. 
Judges may also raise the non-publication issue to be considered at 
court meetings, particularly at sessions, like the Ninth Circuit’s 
Symposium, where the judges meet to discuss more general matters of 
law and policy. One judge’s concerns about “the fidelity with which we 
                                                                                                             
 19 Quotes without attribution are to materials to which the author was provided 
access on the condition that the names of authors would not be revealed. 
 20 Id.  
 21 Quotes from interviews are without attribution when the interviews were 
conducted on the basis of the interviewee’s anonymity. 
 22 See Stephen L. Wasby, “Into the Soup?” The Acclimation of Ninth Circuit 
Appellate Judges, 73 JUDICATURE 10 (1989). 
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honor our nonpublication policy” led him to suggest having a symposium 
panel, because, as he observed in a memorandum to all the court’s 
judges, “Quality control involves our custom of publishing only those 
dispositions that ought to be published.”23 One aspect of quality control 
is a simple failure “to be more alert . . . when we agree with the result . . . 
but we fail to scrutinize the language of the unpublished decision 
because it is unpublished, and we don’t want to take the time to polish 
the product.” Whatever prompts judges’ concerns about “quality control” 
and publication practices, discussion in such settings may serve to raise 
judges’ consciousness about the relevant issues and to resocialize them to 
the rules. The repeated raising of the “quality control” issue makes clear, 
however, that socialization, or resocialization, is never complete, and 
judges’ individual inclinations or values at times cause slippage in 
compliance with the rules. 
II. SPECIFIC GUIDELINES 
A. A New Rule of Law: Cases of First Impression 
We now turn to examine each of the criteria. Among them, Rule 
36-2 (a) — that publication should occur where a ruling “establishes, 
alters, modifies, or clarifies a rule of law”24 — is of particular 
importance. One of the principal purposes for publishing dispositions is 
to add to the development of the law, and publication is clearly in order 
in such cases because of their contribution to that end. This rule specifies 
that cases of first impression in the circuit must be published to be 
available as circuit precedent. This means that while judges may use 
rulings from other circuits to support their positions, if those rulings are 
sufficiently persuasive that the judges believe they should be followed 
and there is no Ninth Circuit ruling on point, the disposition should be 
published to create circuit precedent. 
When there is no law of the circuit on point, the court is deciding 
the question for the first time; by adopting the position of another circuit, 
even if only by citing a case, new circuit law is created de facto. This is 
true no matter how simple, trivial, and noncontroversial the point. In 
such situations, the rule means that publication should follow as a matter 
of course. As one judge observed, “Our conclusion that this decision 
meets the criteria for publication was prompted by the fact that it 
                                                                                                             
 23 See supra note 19.   
 24 9TH CIR. R. 36-2(a).  
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establishes a rule of law that we had not previously announced in a 
published opinion. See 9th Cir. R. 36-2(a).”25 
By adopting the position of another circuit, even if only by citing a 
case, a court of appeals is creating new circuit law de facto, and this does 
not depend on existence of a dispute over the point for which the out-of-
circuit case is cited. Thus when a Ninth Circuit panel stated, 
“Withdrawal of a plea of guilty requires that there exist a ‘cognizable 
defense’ not presented at the time of the arraignment,”26 and cited only a 
D.C. Circuit case for that proposition,27 the disposition should have been 
published to make that point into circuit precedent. Even more obvious 
was the case in which a panel, affirming a ruling of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, said that a Seventh Circuit case was “close” and 
added, “We approve that decision . . .” 28; this was an adoption of an out-
of-circuit rule that should have been published to make the rule available 
as circuit precedent. 
Likewise, when a panel chooses between positions staked out by 
other circuits to adopt a rule for its own circuit, publication is necessary, 
as can be seen in the observation by one member of a three-judge panel 
to his panel colleagues: “Because this disposition involves a choice 
between a Sixth Circuit case and a Seventh Circuit case which cannot be 
distinguished, I believe the disposition qualifies for publication as an 
opinion under our practices.”29 This likewise applies when the law of 
another circuit is rejected; here, publication is considered even more 
necessary because an intercircuit conflict is being created. When the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed a ruling on the basis that a motion to alter a 
sentence was time-barred, the judges discussed how the circuit’s rule was 
different from that in other circuits, saying they “decline the invitation” 
to reconsider the rule despite the intercircuit split.30 
The guideline itself does not seem to be controversial, and its 
application should be fairly straightforward. A panel, dealing with a 
Hawaii statute brought into play in a negligence suit against the United 
States, found that “we probably had to publish in view of the absence of 
                                                                                                             
 25 United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 26 See supra note 19.  
 27 United States v. Mignot, No. 76-3652, 554 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1977) (unpublished 
table decision). 
 28  Park v. INS, No. 76-1356, 556 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1977) (unpublished table 
decision). 
 29 Referencing English v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 18 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 1994) (Judge 
Alfred T. Goodwin to panel).  Where a case is not cited directly, but is instead noted 
because it is the basis for a judge’s comment (e.g., an inter-panel memo, interview, e-
mail), the signal “Referencing” will be used hereinafter. 
 30 Clay v. United States, 30 F. App’x 607, 609 (7th Cir. 2002). See also Stephen L. 
Wasby, Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals, 63 MONT. L. REV. 119 (2002). 
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any circuit level authority” on that statute.31 There may, however, be 
some disagreement as to when the guideline requires publication, but this 
creates pressure that can override objections to publishing, and it 
receives special attention from the judges as they communicate with each 
other. The guideline’s effect can be seen in conference memos, as when a 
judge was reported to have “felt that publication was appropriate, 
because we do not yet have authority applying Davis [32] in the context 
of a juvenile case,” and, in another case, the presiding judge, while 
saying the author could prepare either an opinion or unpublished 
disposition, said, “[P]erhaps it should be an opinion because it is our 
circuit’s first case on this.”33 It is also reflected in the statement of a 
judge circulating a proposed opinion, “Because we will be making new 
law that the 1991 amendment to the §4A1.2 commentary is not a 
clarifying amendment, I think we need to publish.”34 In another case, a 
judge called to his colleagues’ attention “that there is currently no Ninth 
Circuit law on the issue whether a court may depart based on uncounted 
juvenile sentences,”35 while another writing judge said of his proposed 
disposition on the applicability of Sentencing Guidelines, “We may want 
to consider publishing, because there is no dispositive precedent in this 
circuit, and because the issue (or closely analogous ones) likely will 
recur.”36 
When a writing judge raises the possible need to publish, other 
members of the panel may chime in to say that publication is required 
because the disposition now makes new circuit precedent. Thus, in one 
case, where the author said, “As there is no Ninth Circuit precedent on 
partial filing fees, this may be a decision that should be issued as an 
opinion,” another panel member wrote to “suggest that it be made an 
opinion since we have no precedent of our court on the subject.”37 In 
another case, after a judge submitting a proposed disposition said, “We 
may want to consider publishing, because there is no dispositive 
precedent in this circuit,” a colleague responded, “We need law on the 
                                                                                                             
 31 Referencing Howard v. United States, 181 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 32 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
 33 Referencing United States v. Doe, 60 F.3d 544 (9th Cir. 1995); King v. United 
States, 152 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 34 Referencing United States v. Bishop, 1 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 35 Referencing United States v. Beck, 992 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). 
This judge originally said that not publishing was justified because of reliance on the 
Guidelines, but a colleague wrote to “suggest that we publish it as a per curiam” because 
the government would request publication if it were not initially published. 
 36 Referencing United States v. Schram, 9 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 37 See supra note 19.  
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subject in our circuit.”38 The argument for publication on this basis can 
also come later, even when the panel considers a petition for rehearing or 
during consideration of a party’s request for redesignation of an 
unpublished memorandum disposition as a published opinion. 
Where the court does not publish in situations where no Ninth 
Circuit case is cited, a litigant’s request for redesignation as a published 
opinion will likely be based at least in part on the claim that the case is 
one of first impression. Examples are claims that “the case is one of first 
impression on the appellate court level concerning ERISA’s preemption 
of this particular statute,”39 or “A number of the issues raised by this 
appeal have either not been addressed in this circuit or have not received 
the attention necessary to permit their citation as authority.”40 And the 
judges show their sensitivity to the rule in responding to redesignation 
requests, as when a judge, observing “we are contributing new Ninth 
Circuit law in this disposition,” wrote to his panel colleagues that “we 
may be obliged to grant the request for publication of this disposition 
pursuant to our policy of publication of dispositions which cite and rely 
on law from sources other than our own prior decisions.”41 However, 
another judge objected, pointing to the court’s having changed the rules 
so that publication was no longer mandated when the court relied on out-
of-circuit law. “Mere mention of a case from another circuit, particularly 
when supporting our own prior rule, would not justify publication in any 
event,” the judge said, “Nor would an incidental reference to another 
circuit’s case, if we were not relying on it as the basis for a proposition 
that we were adopting.”42 The disposition was not published. 
If the writing judge appears not to have followed the rule, and the 
proposed not-for-publication disposition does not contain any within-
circuit citations, another panel member is likely to suggest either that 
missing in-circuit precedent be found or that the ruling be published, and 
will use language like, “I don’t find any Ninth Circuit precedents cited. If 
there aren’t any, we will have to publish.” Thus, in a deportation case, in 
sending a concurrence to the author, a judge said, “I think it should be 
published even though it wasn’t argued. The reason for publication 
includes: . . . citation of a 5th Circuit case, and . . . a 1st Circuit case.” 
                                                                                                             
 38 The former also said publication was warranted “because the issue (or closely 
analogous ones) likely will recur.”  See supra note 19. 
 39 Referencing Trs. of Elec. Workers Health & Welfare Trust v. Marjo Corp., 988 
F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1993) (request from appellee made on Jan. 13, 1993). 
 40 Referencing United States v. Jackson, 947 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1992) (statement 
made on May 27, 1992, by Charles Turner to the Clerk of the Court). 
 41 Lincoln Technical Inst. of Ariz., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 76 F.3d 387 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 42  Id. 
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Such a suggestion might lead the author to revise the disposition to delete 
the citation. 
There are many unpublished memorandum dispositions where 
publication seemed unnecessary because of the absence of an issue of 
first impression, as when a judge, although willing to agree to 
publication of a ruling, felt “that it contains no new law requiring 
publication” and it was not published.43 However, there are instances 
where publication was in order because the case was one of apparent first 
impression in the circuit. An example was a case on a taxpayer’s claim 
that the statute providing for penalties for frivolous returns (TEFRA) 
violated the Origination Clause because the Senate had completely 
amended the House-originated bill.44 In saying, “This contention has 
been rejected by every published decision to consider the question,” the 
court cited only to the Sixth Circuit and the Districts of Arizona and 
Southern California, not the Ninth Circuit, so that even if the judges 
didn’t want to give the tax protestor the limelight, the court’s own rules 
required publication. 
Situations of this sort may arise because of the need to dispose of 
the increasing number of cases, with less attention being given to quality 
control. Panels, a judge has suggested, “frequently fail to publish when 
they should spend a little more time and produce a publishable opinion 
on a subject that really is one of first impression of the circuit.”45  The 
result is that “our unpublished stuff abounds with decisions citing no 9th 
circuit law and relying on 5th or 8th or some other circuit’s research.”46 
This is said to be a danger because the work from the other circuit “may 
indeed be flawed, or obsolete” or it might “not commend itself to a panel 
taking the time to really studying the matter.”47 Reliance on out-of-circuit 
rulings may, however, mean that, once the panel decides to use an 
unpublished memorandum to dispose of a case, the clerks assisting the 
“writing” judge would look only as far as the first citation to support the 
court’s ruling on a point, without considering whether it was from 
outside the circuit or was “home-grown.” 
The rule’s corollary is that if the court has recently published a 
disposition on a particular point of law, a case shortly thereafter on the 
                                                                                                             
 43 Referencing Baskin Distribution, Inc. v. Pittway Corp., No. 96-35882, 141 F.3d 
1173 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to panel). 
 44 Sherman v. Regan, No. 84-2049, 760 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table 
decision). 
 45 E-mail from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, to Stephen L. Wasby (Apr. 27, 1999) [hereinafter Goodwin 1999 E-mail] (on file 
with author). 
 46  Id. 
 47  Id. 
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same point can be an unpublished memorandum disposition which cites 
to that precedent,48 in part because the present case is only an application 
of the law.49 For example, in December 1972, early in its use of 
unpublished dispositions, the Ninth Circuit, rejecting a claim that use of 
hearsay in an indictment was error, said the claim had been rejected both 
in 1969 and again just five months earlier.50 Where the court has decided 
a case directly on point and cites that case, thus pretty much ending the 
matter, a published opinion seems unnecessary, as it would merely 
reiterate the legal point. 
At times, when a panel has several cases on the same point, the 
judges will identify one of the cases as a “lead case” which is to receive a 
published opinion, while the other cases receive memorandum 
dispositions filed after the lead case and citing to it. When there are many 
cases in one area of law,51 the likelihood is great that many will produce 
the same issues, so that publication of some does not require publication 
of other related cases. An example is immigration cases in which the INS 
refuses to grant asylum and withholding of deportation.52 Unpublished 
dispositions were used to deal with border search cases after Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States,53 such as several 1977 rulings54 in which the 
Ninth Circuit, on the government’s petition, granted rehearing and 
reversed district judges’ rulings suppressing evidence because the fixed 
checkpoint searches at issue took place after the date in which the en 
banc Ninth Circuit had said its ruling on such searches should apply.55 
                                                                                                             
 48 See e.g., Brevard Eng’g Coll., No. 71-2697 (9th Cir. May, 30 1973) (citing Durst 
v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 452 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1971)); Castillo v. Comm’r, 71-1922 (9th Cir. 
Aug. 7, 1973) (citing Sanders v. Comm’r, 439 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1971)). 
 49 See infra note 198 and accompanying text for further discussion on application. 
 50 United States v. Sulaica, No. 72-2144 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 1974). 
 51 The staff attorneys identify cases with the same or similar issues, which are 
grouped for assignment to one panel rather than distributed to many panels; the goal is to 
reduce inconsistency in treatment. 
 52 An instance is a series of cases on the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of 
asylum to Sikhs. See Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501 (9th Cir. 1995).  The memorandum 
dispositions included Sindhu v. INS, 66 F.3d 336 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table 
decision), and Singh v. Ilchert, 64 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision). 
Also see United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1997), followed by Nordquest 
v. United States, No. 96-80323, 107 F.3d 16 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision), 
in which the two-line Order began: “For the reasons stated in Lorentsen v. United States . 
. . .” 
 53 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 
 54 See United States v. Mintz, No. 74-2505, 562 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1977) (unpublished 
table decision); United States v. Olmstead, No. 94-2759, 562 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(unpublished table decision); United States v. Jarvis, No. 74-2502, 538 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 
1976) (unpublished table decision), superceded by 562 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 55 United States v. Escalante, 554 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1977) (en banc). 
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Yet where there are previous rulings in the circuit, publication may aid if 
it is not clear how the cases fit together. A Ninth Circuit case discussing 
earlier cases arguably should have been published, particularly as it also 
included a dissent.56 Where a panel engages in an extended discussion 
distinguishing among past cases,57 it seems strange to go to that trouble 
and then not publish, as another panel would have to go through the same 
“drill.” 
This guideline may also lead to publication of only one element in a 
case while others are disposed of by memorandum disposition. Thus, in 
denying a habeas petition challenging a state first-degree murder 
conviction,58 the writing judge said, “We may want to publish at least 
part of this, because we have not previously held that Carter v. 
Kentucky[59] is not retroactive on collateral review under Teague v. 
Lane.[60]” The other panel members agreed, with one saying that because 
of publication, “I think a slightly more expansive explanation of our 
conclusion that Carter did not announce a new rule is in order.”61 Having 
disposed of that issue in a published opinion, the panel used a 
memorandum disposition to rule on challenges to evidentiary rulings.62 
Starting from its earliest use of unpublished dispositions, there are 
many Ninth Circuit examples where citation to one or more Ninth Circuit 
cases indicated that there was circuit precedent on the points raised, so 
that publication was not necessary. In one of the court’s many Selective 
Service cases, the panel quoted from earlier rulings on the point that a 
draft board did not have to treat every letter from an individual as an 
appeal and on implications of an applicant’s failure to provide additional 
information,63 and in affirming another Selective Service case, the court 
cited to two 1971 rulings concerning time periods for local board 
action.64 
A later instance where the result was clear on the basis of earlier 
Ninth Circuit cases and non-publication would seem to follow was a case 
                                                                                                             
 56 See Singh v. INS, 35 F. App’x 469 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 57 See, for example, United States v. Williams, 29 F. App’x 198 (6th Cir. 2001), 
involving Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). For studies of Apprendi in the 
Sixth Circuit, see Emery G. Lee III, Policy Windows on the Courts of Appeals, 24 JUST. 
SYS. J. 301 (2003), and Emery G. Lee III, Court of Appeals Decision-Making in the Wake 
of Apprendi v. New Jersey, paper presented to Midwest Political Science Association, 
April 2004 (on file with author). 
 58 Referencing Shults v. Whitley, 982 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 59 450 U.S. 288 (1981). 
 60 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
 61  Referencing Shults, 982 F.2d 361. 
 62 See Shults v. Whitley, 981 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision). 
 63 See United States v. Poplawski, No. 72-1959 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 1972). 
 64 See United States v. Brown, No. 72-2114 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 1972). 
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challenging land use restrictions on several grounds.65 Affirming the 
district court’s antitrust dismissal, the appeals court reversed as to the 
lower court’s dismissals based on Railroad Commission of Texas v. 
Pullman and Younger v. Harris66 and ordered the district court to stay 
proceedings until state condemnation litigation was completed. 
Explaining why Younger abstention was not appropriate, the judges then 
noted, “Virtually every court abstaining in a land use case has ordered 
Pullman abstention, not Younger abstention, and has required the district 
court to retain jurisdiction,” and cited not only two Supreme Court cases 
but five Ninth Circuit cases and four from other circuits.67 
Where the court has made a point numerous times, publishing a 
disposition reiterating it briefly and citing circuit precedents hardly 
seems necessary. Thus when someone convicted for being a felon with a 
firearm claimed the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), was unconstitutional 
under the Supreme Court’s recent federalism cases,68 the court of appeals 
took only one paragraph of discussion to say “We have repeatedly 
rejected this contention” and to cite four Ninth Circuit cases in all of 
which the Supreme Court had denied certiorari.69 
Some examples suggest that compliance with this guideline is not 
complete. As one judge has suggested, “Although an unpublished 
disposition citing nothing but out-of-circuit cases is a ‘No-No,’” the 
standard is “violated from time to time.”70 An early example of not 
publishing a disposition in which only out-of-circuit cases were cited for 
the major point in a case was one in which the Ninth Circuit said there 
was no constitutional right to bail pending appeal; state judges’ 
discretion was upheld and cases from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits were 
cited.71 If there was no Ninth Circuit case to cite, publication seemed 
called for although this was a preliminary point in the case. 
Another possible “rule-violation” is an early unpublished 
disposition containing an extended discussion of seizure of films where 
liquor is sold.72 The court said the case was no different from an earlier 
Ninth Circuit case, but no Ninth Circuit citation appears; moreover, the 
                                                                                                             
 65 See Campbell v. City of Phoenix, No. 83-2714, 755 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 66 R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Younger v. Harris, 401 
U.S. 37 (1971). 
 67  See Campbell, 755 F.2d 932. 
 68 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 524 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 69 See United States v. Rowland, 37 F. App’x 304 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 70 Goodwin 1999 E-mail, supra note 45. 
 71 See Byers v. Wood, No. 73-1552 (9th Cir. Nov. 7, 1973). 
 72 See Kuzinich v. Kirby, No. 26602 (9th Cir. July 26, 1973). 
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memorandum disposition contained thorough substantive discussion and 
the judgment was a reversal of the lower court, giving added weight to 
publication, but the panel contained only two judges, who disagreed over 
the rationale for their result, one concurring only in the result. However, 
publication here would have revealed that the issue and its resolution 
were still open matters, and the disagreement between the two judges 
might call into play the statement that “if courts are using unpublished 
opinions to announce new rules of decision, while self-consciously 
rejecting others that might plausibly be followed, they are violating their 
own standards for deciding cases without published opinions.”73 
Another situation that would seem to call for publication is the 
circuit’s first application of a new ruling from the Supreme Court; even if 
the application seems obvious, publication should follow if the court of 
appeals has not already incorporated the Supreme Court’s decision into 
its own precedent. In a suit against a deputy sheriff and a county for 
failure to provide prompt medical assistance, an appellate ruling on the 
district judge’s summary judgment for defendants on state law claims 
based on a jury answer that was limited to federal law would not have 
required publication.74 However, in reversing and remanding because 
retrial was necessary, the court decided a number of matters against 
plaintiff/cross-appellant on the basis of the intervening ruling in Daniels 
v. Williams,75 which barred recovery under § 1983 for negligence. The 
statement that “negligence is not actionable under section 1983. Daniels, 
106 S.Ct. at 665,” despite its obviousness, was new law in the circuit, as 
was a statement that, “In the absence of a showing deliberate 
indifference, a claim of negligence not actionable as a violation of due 
process. Daniels, 106 S.Ct. at 665.”76 Both statements should have led to 
publication. 
The question of publication may have been closer in another 
instance in which an unpublished disposition was used to begin the 
process of applying a new Supreme Court ruling.77 Here the court of 
appeals found that the district court had erred in holding that Miranda 
did not apply to statements, made during a defendant’s post-conviction 
talk with a psychiatrist, that were used only at sentencing, because in 
Estelle v. Smith,78 the Supreme Court had “indicated circumstances in 
                                                                                                             
 73 Hellman statement, supra note 4. 
 74 See Condon v. County of Ventura, No. 84-5753, 792 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 75 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
 76  See Condon, 792 F.2d 144. 
 77 Malone v. Avenenti, No. 85-2192, 787 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table 
decision). 
 78 451 U.S. 454 (1981). 
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which failure to give a Miranda warning may require exclusion of a 
defendant’s statements at a sentencing proceeding that does not affect the 
determination of guilt or innocence.” Because the court of appeals found 
that the Supreme Court’s decision came only twelve days before the 
recommendations by the magistrate in the present case, the court thought 
this should not prevent the defendant from presenting his claim on the 
matter even in a successive habeas petition, so an unpublished 
memorandum may have been thought to be a sufficient means of asking 
the district judge to make the initial application of the Supreme Court’s 
new decision, as the court of appeals could always publish further 
explication when the case returned. And perhaps a published opinion was 
not necessary to establish that Estelle v. Smith could be applied in a 
habeas proceeding, as the Ninth Circuit had already so held. 
If, however, in a case not yet taken to the Supreme Court, the court 
of appeals issues only a simple remand to the district court to reconsider 
its ruling in light of the justices’ recently-decided X v. Y, there would be 
no need to publish that order, as the matter is likely to return to the court 
of appeals after the district court’s action on remand, providing at that 
time a sufficient opportunity to issue a published opinion. Indeed, 
unpublished dispositions are often used to remand cases for further 
consideration in light of a recent Supreme Court decision in a different, 
but clearly related, case.79 Thus a panel vacated and remanded a district 
court judgment dismissing an action because that decision had been 
made “prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman, 
424 U.S. 409 (1976)” on prosecutorial immunity, as the court of appeals 
wanted the district court “to consider whether any of the allegations in 
the complaint might support a finding that the district attorney acted 
outside his authority or in a rule other than in his quasi-judicial 
capacity”80 – the situation in which the justices had said a suit could 
proceed. 
B. Clarifying the Law 
Even when a ruling is not totally one of first impression, its content 
might contribute to the law’s development, thus suggesting the need for 
publication, and Ninth Circuit Rule 36-2(a) suggests publication when a 
ruling “clarifies a point of law.” Thus a writing judge told his colleagues 
                                                                                                             
 79 See, e.g., Port of St. Helens v. State of Oregon, No. 75-3525, 551 F.2d 313 (9th 
Cir. 1977) (unpublished table decision) (remanding to the district court “for further 
proceedings in light of the decision of the United States Supreme Court” in Oregon ex 
rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977)). 
 80 United Farm Workers of Am. v. Leddy, No. 75-1691, 568 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(unpublished table decision). 
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it might be better to publish a ruling because the legal issue — denial of 
an insurance claim for failure to submit an authorization to view medical 
records — was “rather murky.”81 Thus, a case may be published to make 
matters clear to district judges. As one judge observed in a Sentencing 
Guidelines case,82 “We owe it to the trial judges to give them some 
guidance in this difficult area,” and in a case on possessing counterfeit 
access devices and equipment, a member of the panel said he thought “it 
would be helpful to the district courts and to the bar, if we publish.”83 
When lawyers complain about the need for clear law, the judges 
may respond with a published opinion intended to reduce some of the 
confusion. Thus in one appeal centering on a sentencing guideline issue 
— “what method . . . [a] district court [may] use to approximate the 
quantity of drugs involved in an offense” — the writing judge, who 
wrote that the issue “has not been clearly addressed by any published 
opinion in this circuit,” called attention to the defense counsel’s having 
“expressed frustration with the current state of law,” which the attorney 
said involved cases “‘confined to their own particular facts, none of 
which are cited in the opinion.’”84 As a result, the writing judge stated, 
“A published order would provide direction to both parties and district 
courts,” and a published ruling did result. 
An instance in which publication would have been in order to 
clarify the law involved a journalist’s civil contempt for refusal to 
answer deposition questions about events she had seen, a topic on which 
there were few cases so a ruling could have fleshed out when the 
privilege applies.85 Although the court, discussing Branzburg v. Hayes86 
and the balance to be struck, concluded that the need for disclosure 
outweighed minimal First Amendment interests and said that journalists 
could be protected without sustaining the privilege in this case, it did not 
publish the ruling.87 Likewise, when the court said that a mental illness 
instruction was invited error because the defense had requested it and 
thus could be reversed only in an “exceptional situation,” publication 
could have elucidated what was an “exceptional situation” as the judges 
                                                                                                             
 81 Referencing Newcomb v. Standard Ins. Co., 187 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 82 See United States v. Anders, 956 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 83 Referencing United States v. Watson, 118 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 84 Referencing United States v. August, 86 F.3d 151 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 85 See In re Kioshi-Nelson v. Camarcho, No. 95-1632, 758 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 86 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 87  See In re Kioshi-Nelson, 758 F.2d 656. 
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said the error, although more serious than those in earlier Ninth Circuit 
cases cited, was not exceptional.88 
However, in other situations when the distinction between 
precedential cases is at issue, judges may think publication is warranted 
to help clarify matters for lower court judges and for lawyers. We can see 
this when a judge told his colleagues, “As to publishing the opinion, I 
felt that the distinction between [two cases] by the policy language alone 
would help to guide lawyers in future cases.” In another case, the writing 
judge said, “The disposition is written for publication because if left 
unpublished, the distinction between this case and Norgaard will be 
likely to escape notice,” adding that “other ingenious counsel will keep 
trying to invest in a ‘Norgaard extension’ of the silence-at-sentencing 
argument”89; here we can see use of publication to clarify in an attempt 
to limit future caseload. This could also be seen when a different judge 
wished to publish a portion of a disposition on the issue of whether a 
prisoner could obtain interest on his prison bank account: “My 
preference is to publish the portion of the disposition dealing with the 
interest question, so as to obviate the need for further prisoner suits on 
this issue.”90 
C. Calling Attention 
Calling the attention of district judges and lawyers to matters they 
may have overlooked (see Ninth Circuit Rule 36-2(b)) is closely related 
to clarifying the law. Thus a judge preparing a memorandum disposition 
said “it may be advisable to have it printed because of our analysis on the 
consecutive sentence and the application of” an earlier Ninth Circuit 
case; calling it “an important rule,” he felt that all district judges should 
be advised on the continued viability of that case.91 When a panel 
                                                                                                             
 88 Referencing People of Territory of Guam v. Alvarez, 763 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 
1985) (unpublished table decision). 
 89 Referencing United States v. Gerace, No. 92-10388, 997 F.2d 1293, 1295 (9th Cir. 
1993) (citing United States v. Norgaard, 959 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 90 Referencing Tellis v. Godinez, 5 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir. 1993); 8 F.3d 30 (unpublished 
table decision) (memorandum to panel).  Part of the disposition was placed in the 
unpublished memorandum disposition, because, even though one of the judges was going 
to dissent, he stated, “our diverse collection of views does not merit publication because 
they will provide no guidance to prison administrators or district judges.”  Referencing 
Tellis, 8 F.3d 30 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision). 
 91 See United States v. Kikuyama, 109 F.3d 536 (9th Cir. 1997), referencing United 
States v. Doering, 909 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1990), which held that the need for psychiatric 
help was not the type of extraordinary instance where a defendant’s mental/emotional 
condition was relevant to the sentence. Doering involved an upward departure from the 
Sentencing Guidelines; in the present case, the court held the condition relevant to 
consecutive sentences. 
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considered a case on armed bank robbery, in the aftermath of a Supreme 
Court ruling defining “use” of a gun,92 the writing judge had initially 
circulated a brief memorandum disposition, but another panel member 
had written, “I suggest that this is the kind of post-Bailey case that should 
be published to assist the trial judges (and our forgetful panels).”93 
A judge’s direct experience with lawyers’ lack of knowledge of 
what the judge thought an important point led him to propose a published 
opinion. After oral argument in a case involving a challenge to a 
restitution order, the judge had sat as part of a different panel in another 
case “in which the U.S. Attorney had no idea that for restitution purposes 
the conduct had to be an element of the offense.”94 Because this lawyer 
“appeared to be a senior attorney but was genuinely surprised when we 
explained the law to him . . . I decided that an opinion explaining 
Hughey[95] and the effect of the statutory amendment might be useful.”96 
A disposition may also be published to remind lawyers practicing in 
the court of certain procedural or substantive matters. Where the 
disposition in a quiet title action involving an easement referred to the 
Declaration of Taking as determinative, one judge agreed with the 
writer’s proposed very brief memorandum and did not “insist” on 
publication but did say, “This appears to be sufficiently important to the 
bar to call attention once again to the effect of the declaration of 
taking.”97 
D. Criticizing Existing Law 
One guideline not often at play is Ninth Circuit Rule 36-2(c), 
calling for publication if the disposition criticizes existing law. Although 
judges do criticize existing law when communicating among themselves 
and off-panel judges may do so when arguing for holding an en banc 
rehearing, one seldom sees such criticism in the court’s formal 
dispositions. Nonetheless, when such criticism does find its way into 
dispositions, publication should result to reveal the uncertainty in the law 
thus suggested. One such candidate for publication was a case involving 
the power of a district court to give consecutive sentences for a single act 
                                                                                                             
 92 See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). 
 93 Referencing United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 1488 (9th Cir. 1997) (per 
curiam) (Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to panel). 
 94  See supra note 19. 
 95  Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990). 
 96 Referencing United States v. Reed, 80 F.3d 1419 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 97 Referencing Hermans v. United States, 86 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished 
table decision).  However, the author preferred not to publish and the disposition was 
filed as a memorandum. 
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violating more than one subparagraph of a single statutory provision.98 
Two panel members thought those sentences were invalid on the basis of 
a 1972 Ninth Circuit case, which they questioned for having “incorrectly 
applied the rule of lenity in looking to legislative history.” They noted 
the earlier ruling’s possible inconsistency with an intervening Supreme 
Court decision and had even deferred submission of the case while they 
decided whether to ask for the en banc hearing that would have been 
necessary if circuit precedent were to be overturned. Saying “we are 
bound by our recent reaffirmation of the law of the circuit,” they 
nonetheless kept the earlier ruling as circuit precedent, although they also 
included a “cf” cite indicating that “if circuit precedent is undermined by 
a Supreme Court ruling, a panel may reexamine earlier cases to 
determine their continuing validity.”99 
The need to publish this ruling, already evident from the Supreme 
Court-Ninth Circuit tension the other panel members saw, is given 
weight by the fact that Judge Reinhardt, even though not pressing for 
publication on the basis of his separate writing, felt impelled to write, 
particularly when his concurrence revealed differences in opinion as to 
the interpretation of double jeopardy in this situation.100 If the case had 
been published, other judges would have paid closer attention to it, and 
would have been aware of the issue when it subsequently arose. When 
uncertainty in the law leads the court to change its disposition upon 
petition for rehearing, this also raises the question as to whether law and 
its application is sufficiently clear that it can be relegated to an 
unpublished disposition.101 
E. Unique Interest and Substantial Importance 
Judges may simply be struck by the specifics of an individual case, 
making it worthy of publication. For example, in a sentencing case 
involving a downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines, 
another judge argued for publication because “it is a rare case when we 
affirm a Koon discretionary departure on ‘heartland’ reasoning.”102 At 
                                                                                                             
 98 See United States v. Yarbrough, No. 85-3041, 797 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 99  Referencing id. The third panel member, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, concurred in 
the judgment. 
 100 See id. 
 101 See, e.g., Kime v. County of Riverside, 872 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1989) (unpublished 
table decision), superceded by 889 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 102 Referencing United States v. Lopez, 106 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1997) (Judge Alfred T. 
Goodwin’s note on the face of a proposed memorandum disposition). The reference is to 
Koon v. United States, 581 U.S. 81 (1996) where the Court approved a downward 
departure in the case of the police officers involved in the Rodney King beating. 
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times publication is suggested simply because the facts are interesting, as 
a judge noted of a case that involved mail fraud related to inflating the 
value of a horse so as to receive a large insurance payment, but the case 
was disposed of by memorandum disposition.103 In a later case on 
deportation of a person found not to be a citizen, this judge suggested 
that “in view of the unusual facts, I suspect it should be published, and so 
suggest.”104 
Although not necessarily equivalent to “importance,” the relative 
complexity of the law plays an important part in the decision to publish. 
Some subjects like antitrust frequently produce complex cases, which are 
often published, while other topics are more likely to result in “simple” 
cases disposed of with memorandum dispositions. Direct criminal 
appeals are among the latter, partly the result of the high proportion of 
criminal convictions and Guideline sentences appealed by federal public 
defenders. However, the hypothesis that, other things being equal, cases 
containing more complex issues are more likely to be published than 
those with simple straight-forward issues is called into question by a 
judge’s observation that “complexity is not as important in the decision 
to publish as is the novelty of the questions posed or the current clarity of 
the law of the circuits.”105 Moreover, the higher proportion of cases now 
resulting in unpublished dispositions means that the proportion of 
“heavy” cases being so decided will have increased. 
F. Published Below 
The rationale for Ninth Circuit Rule 36-2(e) is that if the district court 
disposition was published, the court of appeals ruling should also be. As 
some judges put it, where the ruling below has been published, 
publication by the court of appeals “rounds out the history” of the 
case.106 Subpart (e) of Rule 36-2 formerly read: “Relies in whole or in 
part upon a reported opinion in the case by a district court or an 
administrative agency.” The “relies in whole or in part” has been deleted, 
and “unless the panel determines that publication is necessary for 
clarifying the panel’s disposition of the case” has been added.107 The 
                                                                                                             
 103 Referencing United States v. Mosesian, 972 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 104 Referencing Gutierrez-Tavares v. INS, 92 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 105 E-mail from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, to Stephen L. Wasby (Oct. 16, 2000) [hereinafter Goodwin 2000 E-mail] (on file 
with author). 
 106 Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, note on face of memo transmitting proposed 
unpublished disposition, Jan. 27 1997, United States v. Lopez, 95-10366; the disposition 
was published, 106 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 107  9TH CIR. R. 36-2(e). 
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converse of the rule is that nonpublication below carries no burden to 
publish the appeal, although other reasons related to the appeals court’s 
ruling might lead to publication. For example, in a suit for negligent 
supervision of a daycare center in which summary judgment had been 
given to the government, the panel affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded.108 The lead judge, noting that the law clerk’s bench memo 
recommended publication because the district court had published, noted 
that publication was also called for “since the district court opinion 
conflicts with a state court opinion, and that conflict should be 
clarified.”109 
 The listings of over 9,800 Ninth Circuit unpublished dispositions 
from October 1985 through early January 1992, contained in volumes 
776 - 909 of the Federal Reporter, Second Series, show only 152 as 
having been published below – less than two percent (1.6%) of the 
total.110 While very few unpublished dispositions come in cases that were 
published below, the number of published opinions in which the lower 
court ruling was published is also small. This suggests that publication 
below is not a particularly important factor in the decisions to publish or 
not.111 In 2003, the proportion of unpublished dispositions with rulings 
published below is only a trace – only 5 of almost 2,200 cases in fourteen 
volumes of Federal Appendix (31 - 44 Federal Appendix). In cases with 
published rulings, the proportion in which the lower court disposition 
was published was 7.5 percent for 1973 (471 - 494 F.2d),112 but recently, 
in 2002-2003 (305 - 346 F.3d), the proportion was ten percent.113 
Cases reviewed on appeal lack a consistent publication pattern in 
the lower court because district judges control the decision to publish, 
although West does ask for some other dispositions. As a result, the court 
of appeals may see no need to publish just because the district judge 
                                                                                                             
 108 Referencing Martin ex rel. Martin v. United States, 984 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 109  Id. 
 110 Data collected by author. In calculating such a proportion, one should recognize 
that agency decisions are handled differently from district court opinions. “Published 
below” tends to mean district court – publication in Federal Supplement or perhaps 
Federal Rules Decisions – not agency, although there are reporters for, say, NLRB cases. 
In addition, that a district court opinion is available on Westlaw cite (WL cite) does not 
mean to the court of appeals that it is “published below” for these purposes. 
 111 Many shorter Ninth Circuit dispositions, first on Westlaw and then in Federal 
Appendix, lack even a West headnote and thus any indication of lower court publication, 
although it might be assumed that if the case had been published below, West would give 
it a headnote. Use of Federal Appendix without checking each case on Westlaw may thus 
lead to an undercount of “published below” cases. 
 112 For that time, when use of unpublished dispositions was just beginning, 
determining whether unpublished dispositions were published below is very difficult, as 
the slipsheets do not so indicate. 
 113 If cases with WL cites are included, the figure is almost 15 percent. 
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submitted a case for publication. While some district judges may send 
rulings that are path-breaking disquisitions on the law, to which one 
might expect the court of appeals to respond with a well-developed 
published opinion, other district court rulings sent for publication may be 
of middling importance or even relatively inconsequential, or primarily 
“of interest to the local bench and bar in a particular district.”114 In 
addition, the court of appeals may agree with the lower court’s judgment 
but not with its opinion and may not wish to take the time to develop its 
different view of the law, and the published district court ruling makes 
publicly accessible at least one statement of the rationale supporting the 
judgment. 
As this suggests, appellate court publication of its disposition when 
the district court has published is not the same as adopting the district 
court ruling as its own. Nonetheless, the appeals court may do that, as 
when a law clerk recommended “adopting the order of the district court 
and/or the opinion of the administrative law judge,” because “[b]oth 
opinions provide a more than adequate, and accurate, review of the facts 
and record in this case.”115 For the court to say more, even in an 
unpublished memorandum, would only “reiterate what has been said 
below.” Where the court of appeals does agree with the district court’s 
opinion and relies upon it in affirming, to say, “We affirm for reasons 
stated in the opinion of the district court,” would take up little space in 
the official reports. And if the district court has published an opinion 
which the court of appeals adopts as its own, the rule would suggest that 
even if the result is such a one-line ruling, it should be published. 
Where the district court did not publish, agreement with the district 
court does not, however, require publication on appeal, although the 
court of appeals could append the unpublished district court ruling to its 
own published disposition. However, in one instance when a panel 
contemplated attaching the district court’s decision to an unpublished 
judgment order, the judges decided that it was too long for that purpose. 
Coupled with their view that publication was necessary because of the 
                                                                                                             
 114 WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY, PUBLICATION GUIDE FOR JUDGES OF THE UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1994). See also Karen Swenson, Federal District Court 
Decisions and the Decision to Publish, paper presented to Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, Ill., Apr. 2003 (on file with author); Karen Swenson, Federal 
District Court Decisions and the Decision to Publish, 25 JUST. SYS. J. 121 (2004). See 
also Susan W. Johnson & Ronald Stidham, Federal District Judges and the Decision to 
Publish, paper presented to Southern Political Science Association, Savannah, Ga., Nov. 
2002 (on file with author). 
 115 Referencing Gibson v. Chater, 87 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table 
decision) (memorandum from law clerk to Judge Alfred T. Goodwin). The ultimate 
memorandum disposition was more than the one-line “We adopt . . .” language but was 
only two paragraphs long, affirming for substantial evidence.  Id. 
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absence of circuit precedent on a key point at issue, they decided that 
their disposition would have to become a published opinion.116 
In most instances in which an unpublished disposition is used even 
though the case was published below, the court of appeals affirms the 
lower court. For example, we find an unpublished disposition when the 
denial of a preliminary injunction was affirmed for the district court’s 
reasons, although a reinforcing reason was that the appeals court would 
get another crack at the case after further proceedings below.117 
However, unpublished memoranda are also used when the court of 
appeals reverses a published lower court ruling, a situation presenting a 
strong case for appellate court publication, so that the reviewing court 
can make widely known that it has overturned the lower court’s 
considered judgment with one of its own. 
G. Supreme Court Remands 
When the Supreme Court remands a case for further action, Ninth 
Circuit Rule 36-2(f) leads the court of appeals to publish its orders on 
remand. These invariably short orders were not previously published, 
and a 1985 Federal Judicial Center study indicated that Ninth Circuit 
judges “do not necessarily publish a decision on a remand from the 
Supreme Court.”118 After some judges complained, the rule was changed, 
and the Ninth Circuit now publishes most rulings on remand, even 
simple one-paragraph orders solely remanding to the district court “for 
further proceedings consistent with” the Supreme Court’s opinion.119 
Although the new rule is seemingly quite clear, a dispute may occur 
over its implementation. For example, a Ninth Circuit judge sought the 
help of the chief judge on “a matter about which the members of the 
court need guidance” — whether publication should occur in a specified 
situation.120 As the judge recounted it, the Supreme Court had reversed 
and remanded a Ninth Circuit ruling that had reversed an administrative 
law judge’s final determination. Receiving the case on remand, the panel 
“in a fourteen-page memorandum disposition again reversed the 
administrative law judge on an issue not discussed in the two published 
opinions.” When a panel member suggested that publication was 
                                                                                                             
 116 Referencing Howard v. United States, 181 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 117 Referencing Johnson v. Orr, No. 85-2017, 787 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 118 Stienstra, supra note 12, at 35. 
 119 See, e.g., Catholic Soc. Servs. v. Reno, 996 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1993). For a 
marginally longer instance, see Ortega v. Roe, 209 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000), on remand 
from 528 U.S. 470 (2000). 
 120 Judge Warren Ferguson to Chief Judge James Browning, Sept. 1 1987. The case is 
not named nor is the ultimate outcome available in the file. 
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customary after a Supreme Court’s reversal and remand, “[t]he others 
decided that the case was not worthy of publication under ordinary 
publication guidelines and does not meet the criteria set forth” in the 
court of appeals rules.121 
Publication of a ruling on remand disposing of a case on the merits 
by affirming or reversing the district court would not be surprising, even 
when the Ninth Circuit’s original ruling was unpublished. For example, 
the Supreme Court’s per curiam reversal, in United States v. 
Nachtigal,122 of a Ninth Circuit memorandum disposition led on remand 
to a published ruling on the merits,123 and when the Supreme Court 
reversed another Ninth Circuit unpublished memorandum on whether a 
single act could constitute sexual harassment,124 the remand affirming the 
district court was also published.125 Likewise, when the Supreme Court, 
in its major ruling on statutory reinstatement of securities cases, reversed 
three unpublished Ninth Circuit dispositions,126 the Ninth Circuit 
published the order remanding to the district court.127 Of particular 
interest is the instance in which, after the Supreme Court ruled on a 
Ninth Circuit unpublished ruling, the court of appeals attached its prior 
disposition to its published order of remand to the district court, “after 
removing the restrictions against citation.”128 
Publication of remand orders would certainly follow when the prior 
Ninth Circuit ruling has been published, by analogy with the guideline 
that when the lower court ruling has been published, the court of appeals’ 
disposition should also be published. For example, when a Ninth Circuit 
order was reversed by the Supreme Court in the 1975 Term,129 the order 
                                                                                                             
 121  Id. 
 122 507 U.S. 1 (1993). 
 123 37 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 124 Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001), rev’g 232 F.3d 893 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision). 
 125 Breeden v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 258 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 126 Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrew v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991). 
 127 See Reitz v. Leasing Consultants, 961 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Lozada 
v. Deeds, 964 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1992) (the unpublished remand of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430 (1991), reversing and remanding the Ninth 
Circuit’s unpublished order); Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1989) (the 
unpublished remand of Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983), which vacated and 
remanded the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished ruling, 701 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(unpublished table decision)). 
 128 United States v. Old Chief, 121 F.3d 448 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997). Also unusual is the 
situation in which the Ninth Circuit initially issued a memorandum disposition but, after 
Supreme Court oral argument, redesignated the disposition as a published opinion. See 
Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 238 F.3d 1196, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 129 Henry v. Warner, 493 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1974), rev’d, Middendorf v. Henry, 425 
U.S. 25 (1976). 
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on remand, further remanding to the district court, was published.130 
What is interesting is the almost invariant application of the rule to 
orders remanding to the district court for application of the justices’ 
ruling. There are times when the post-remand disposition is per curiam 
rather than signed, but for a short disposition, this is of no matter; under 
the court’s rules, it is publication, not authorship, that matters. In other 
instances, the disposition is labeled an “Order,” also unsigned,131 and the 
court even uses the “Order” format when one of the panel members 
dissents.132 
When the Supreme Court grants certiorari, vacates the lower court 
ruling, and remands (GVR) for reconsideration in light of an intervening 
case, we would expect publication of the court of appeals’ subsequent 
disposition because the GVR requires consideration of the Supreme 
Court’s intervening ruling. Even when a GVR leads the court of appeals 
to remand to the district court, the remand order will be published. And 
publication is likely even when the prior Ninth Circuit ruling was 
unpublished, as in the aftermath of the major Indian fishing rights 
case,133 when the Supreme Court GVR’d three Ninth Circuit cases — all 
unpublished — for reconsideration in light of that case.134 This shows the 
strength of the rule on publication of remands from the Supreme 
Court.135 However, if the GVR were for mootness, a published ruling 
would hardly be necessary, unless the court of appeals had to parse the 
law of mootness or it was religiously adhering to the guidelines.136 
                                                                                                             
 130 Henry v. Warner, 536 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 131 See, e.g., Navarette v. Enomoto, 581 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 132 See, e.g., United States v. Culbert, 581 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1978) (Ely, J., 
dissenting). 
 133 Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 
658 (1979).  
 134 See Harrington v. United States, Dolman v. United States, and Minnick v. United 
States, 604 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 135 Also see United States v. Carlisle, 967 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table 
decision), in which the Ninth Circuit had originally issued a memorandum disposition, 
but, after the Supreme Court GVR’d, 510 U.S. 1068 (1994), in light of Ratzlaf v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), the subsequent Ninth Circuit order was published, 18 F.3d 
752 (9th Cir. 1994). See also United States v. Tomlin, 28 F.3d 110 (9th Cir. 1994), GVR, 
513 U.S. 1107, in light of Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995); on remand, 62 
F.3d 320 (9th Cir. 1995). Interestingly, in publishing an order on remand from a Supreme 
Court GVR, the Fifth Circuit attached its earlier unpublished per curiam as an Appendix. 
See United States v. Peebles, 296 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2002), on remand from Peebles v. 
United States, 535 U.S. 1014 (2002), in light of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 
U.S. 234 (2002); and United States v. Tampico, 297 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2002), on remand 
from Tampico v. United States, 535 U.S. 1014 (2002), in light of same case. 
 136 When the Supreme Court GVR’d a Ninth Circuit en banc disposition with 
instructions to have the district court dismiss the case as moot, Olagues v. Russoniello, 
797 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc), GVR, Russoniello v. Olagues, 484 U.S. 806 
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H. Separate Opinions 
Some circuits’ guidelines require publication of cases with a dissent 
or concurrence, and the Ninth Circuit did so earlier. The Ninth Circuit’s 
present Rule 36-2(g) makes publication of these cases discretionary with 
the writer.137 This makes the dissenter the de facto decision-maker as to 
publication. Indeed, the extent to which the dissenter controls publication 
can be seen in a Tenth Circuit case, where, attached to the designation 
“Publish,” is the terse footnote: “The majority opinion is published only 
because the dissent is published.”138 There has even been a situation, 
which occurred relatively early in the use of unpublished dispositions, in 
which a dissenter from a memorandum ruling set out the text of that 
unpublished ruling in a footnote to his published dissent.139 
The presence of dissents in unpublished dispositions indicates that 
some dissenters do not opt for publication. A disposition with a dissent 
is, however, more likely to be published than is a unanimous disposition, 
so published opinions over-represent non-unanimous dispositions.140 In 
1998, when the Ninth Circuit had an 18 percent overall publication rate, 
two-thirds of its cases with a dissent and almost 90 percent with a 
concurrence had a published opinion.141 More recently, in cases reported 
in 27 Federal Appendix, dissents or concurrences were found in 1.8 
percent of cases in circuits which permitted citation of unpublished 
dispositions and in 2.7 percent of circuits banning such citation.142 For 
the Ninth Circuit, dissents or concurrences appeared in 4.9 percent of 
these “unpublished” cases.143 
Separate opinions have generally been infrequent in the Ninth 
Circuit’s unpublished dispositions. For example, in 31 Federal Appendix, 
which contained 269 memorandums and orders from that court, there 
were no concurring opinions and only two dissents.144 In one 
immigration case, the dissent was a simple notation that in the judge’s 
                                                                                                             
(1987), the disposition on remand was also en banc and was published. Olagues v. 
Russoniello, 832 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc). 
 137 Stienstra, supra note 12, at 34-35. 
 138 United States v. Gonzales, 344 F.3d 1036, 1037 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 139 United States v. Hunt, 548 F.2d 268, 268 n.1 (9th Cir. 1973) (Sneed, J., 
dissenting). 
 140 The Federal Reporter lists of “tabled cases” do not reveal dissents, but the dissents 
are clear from the dispositions themselves and they are on Westlaw. They are now quite 
apparent in Federal Appendix. 
 141 McKenna, supra note 9, at 19 (Table 11). 
 142 Stephen L. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West’s Federal Appendix: The 
Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRACT. & PROCESS 1, 19 n.83. 
 143  Id. 
 144 Data collected by author. 
70 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 2:041 
opinion, “exceptional circumstances exist here.”145 The following 
volume, with over three hundred cases, saw only three dissents and two 
other partial dissents, and in 33 Federal Appendix, there were only two 
dissents in 122 cases. The 110 Ninth Circuit dispositions in 34 Federal 
Appendix prompted only five separate writings — two concurrences and 
three dissents, with one concurrence and one dissent written in two 
closely related habeas corpus cases by a district judge sitting by 
designation.146 Thus for these four volumes, the proportion of 
unpublished dispositions accompanied by separate writings was less than 
one percent. By comparison, in the early years of the Ninth Circuit’s use 
of unpublished dispositions, the proportion of those dispositions carrying 
a separate writing started off at just under five percent (4.9%) for 1973, 
the first full year in which unpublished rulings were used, before 
dropping to only 2.0 percent for 1974. For 1972-1977, the overall 
proportion was 3.2 percent, a proportion well above that in the most 
recent period.147 
To determine whether the case is more likely to result in a 
published than an unpublished disposition when a judge writes a separate 
opinion, published opinions in Federal Reporter for volumes covering 
cases in 2002 were compared with unpublished dispositions in Federal 
Appendix from roughly the same period. Comparing cases from 300-304 
F.3d with those from 29-44 Federal Appendix, we find that of 2,162 
unpublished rulings, 53 (only 2.5 percent) contained 56 separate 
writings, compared with 13.8 percent of the 654 published rulings (90, 
with 96 separate opinions).148 Here, too, there was intercircuit 
variation.149 Only one of the Tenth Circuit’s 37 published opinions 
(2.7%) contained a separate writing, like the overall proportion of 
unpublished dispositions with separate opinions. There were similar low 
                                                                                                             
 145 Ahir v. INS, 31 F. App’x 588, 589 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
 146 See Scherbovitch v. Mayle, 34 F. App’x 353 (9th Cir. 2002) (Shea, D.J., 
dissenting); Greenberger v. Farmon, 34 F. App’x 355 (9th Cir. 2002) (Shea, D.J., 
concurring). These two cases also illustrate that, when a court of appeals does not identify 
the author of a memorandum disposition, identification of authorship is facilitated when 
one of the three judges (all of whose names are identified) writes separately. In both these 
cases, the majority opinion carried the footnote: “Of course, we express no opinion about 
what the course of events might be if [the petitioner] tries to return to district court with 
some newly exhausted claims at some later time. We sit to decide concrete cases, not to 
engage in vaticination.” Use of words like “vaticination” is a trademark of Judge 
Ferdinand Fernandez, a member of the panel. 
 147 Data collected by author. 
 148 Id. 
 149 The number of cases per circuit is sufficiently small that we must be careful not to 
place too much weight on these figures. Because the published opinions are often much 
longer than unpublished memorandums, there are far fewer per F.3d volume than per F. 
App’x volume. Some published opinions are short, but most are longer. 
2005] Publication (or Not) of Appellate Rulings 71 
percentages in the First Circuit (5.1%) and Seventh Circuit (6.7%). 
Although the Fourth Circuit had a distinctly high percentage of separate 
opinions in these cases (12 of 27, 44.4%), the proportion of separate 
writings in many of the circuits was between 10 and 20 percent, with the 
Ninth Circuit just above 20 percent (21 cases of 97, 21.6%). For five 
later volumes (320-324 F.3d) covering part of 2003, the proportion of 
dispositions with separate writings was only slightly less (19.2%). For 
the Ninth Circuit, the proportion of published opinions with separate 
writings in 305-346 F.3d remains above one-fifth (23.8%). Because the 
rate at which judges dissent or write concurring opinions may change 
over time, greater frequency of separate writings in later years may 
reflect a change in norms about the filing of such opinions more than an 
increase in disagreement among the judges.) 
One cannot read judges’ minds as to why, after preparing a 
concurrence or dissent, they accede to non-publication, but one can 
evaluate whether the separate writing is such that publication would have 
been preferred. Publishing seems unnecessary when a judge notes a 
concurrence or dissent without opinion. Although a dissent without 
opinion may indicate to the losing party that someone on the court takes 
that side, little would be gained from requiring publication for that reason 
beyond letting the public know that the panel was not unanimous. 
However, non-publication occurs even when the dissent is not simply 
perfunctory. For example, in a Selective Service case, the panel initially 
filed a three-page unpublished memorandum, including discussion of the 
law, that dismissed an indictment.150 This drew a two-page dissent 
arguing that the Selective Service System could not undo the defendant’s 
violation of the law. While the initial disposition was withdrawn in favor 
of a new, short unpublished memorandum in which the court remanded 
to the district court for reconsideration of the effect of the District 
Director’s reopening the file, the dissent was now one without opinion. 
As the revised judgment only remanded for further action, publication 
did not seem necessary. However, publishing the initial disposition 
seemed appropriate, particularly as the dissent dealt directly with a point 
of law.151 
As in that case, there are instances when dissenters forego 
publication even when the dissent is far longer than the majority 
memorandum152 or almost as long.153 However, that a separate opinion is 
                                                                                                             
 150 Referencing United States v. Malone, No. 72-1847, 496 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 151 See id.  
 152 See United States v. Nelson, No. 72-2350 (9th Cir. May 4, 1973), where the 
majority reversed denial of a § 2255 petition and affirmed in one sentence each of two 
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lengthy does not necessarily mean the ruling should be published, as it 
may result only from a serious effort to show that the losing party’s 
argument has “legs” and was heard. If the judge did not feel strongly 
enough to explain the separate position or wish to take the time to write 
the (more) extended analysis which publication would require, such a 
dissent might provide little help in developing the law, although the 
converse is that, if the panel majority decides to use an unpublished 
disposition, the dissenter may decide not to expend the time to write.154 
However, an unpublished dissent may communicate to judicial 
colleagues who monitor such dispositions views on which the writing 
judge wishes to obtain their reaction so that they will keep those views in 
mind for later cases. 
A dissenter may “waive” publication after having made the same 
point, perhaps frequently, in published dissents, and thus does not see the 
need to repeat it in print.155 Likewise, a judge might not insist on 
publication when the judge’s concurrence in the result is based on his 
statements in a prior published opinion, which is cited, and where the 
judge says no more.156 Or the judge may forego publication of a separate 
concurrence when the only point is to note disagreement with a ruling 
which, along with “other controlling precedents,” provides a 
“compulsion . . . to yield.”157 However, when there was non-publication 
when the dissenter disagreed with the majority over its reason and, 
further, said the majority had misstated what the lower court did,158 it 
might appear that the panel was burying quick, careless work, with the 
dissenter going along. 
                                                                                                             
other issues remanding for an evidentiary hearing, but Judge Kilkenny filed a five-page 
dissent. 
 153 For an instance of an unpublished concurrence used to send a message about the 
government’s handling of a case, see the discussion infra of United States v. Archer, 92 
F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision). 
 154 See In re Kioshi-Nelson/Chargualaf v. Camacho, No. 95-1632, 758 F.2d 656 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision). 
 155 See, e.g., United States v. Parker, No. 73-2072 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 1973); United 
States v. Graham, No. 73-2073 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 1973); United States v. Shorty, No. 72-
2636 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 1973).  Judge Ely, dissenting in each case, referenced his own 
dissent in United States v. Holz, 479 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 156 See, e.g., Manzo-Rodriguez v. INS, No. 84-7287, 755 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(unpublished table decision) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in judgment, citing to Ramirez-
Juarez v. INS, 633 F.2d 174, 175-76 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
 157 Williams v. Multnomah County, No. 75-2241, 554 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(unpublished table decision) (Ely, J., concurring). See also Martinez-Galvan v. INS, No. 
76-1660, 556 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1977) (unpublished table decision) (Ely, J., concurring) 
(“My concurrence is compelled by controlling precedent.”). 
 158 See Littlejohn v. Jones, No. 72-2266 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 1973). 
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Those writing separately may also choose not to demand 
publication when the case is a fact-intensive one that does not produce 
new circuit precedent or has an unusual procedural posture that would 
limit the ruling’s later effect, as the judge may feel that publishing 
differing views would not be useful. An example would be a dissent 
embodying a disagreement over sufficiency of the evidence.159 A dissent 
containing little law, which was not only heavily fact-based but also 
spoke primarily of “justice,” is likewise also not a strong candidate for 
publication because it speaks more to the parties than to the legal 
community that has to deal with similar future cases. An example is a 
case on the severability of an (illegal) agreement to sell securities from 
an agreement to provide legal services, where the majority held the 
agreements not severable, but Judge Wiggins felt his colleagues in the 
majority had “unnecessarily reache[d] a result that does not comport with 
simple justice” because they allowed someone to get the benefit of 
services without paying for them.160 In addition, when the point of the 
separate opinion is to argue for remand to reconsider a portion of a 
sentence and to criticize the majority for failing to provide supporting 
citation or for using dicta, publication may not seem necessary to the 
writer.161 
A judge writing might also decline to publish a separate opinion 
when the circumstances were unusual and the opinion did not 
particularly speak to the development of the law, as when a concurrence 
was written to explain to the parties the judge’s responsibility for 
extended delay in disposing of a petition for rehearing.162 
There are dissents with fact-based conclusions which would help 
develop the law, leading one to question the failure to publish. In one 
such case, the majority affirmed dismissal of a habeas petition which 
challenged the exclusion of testimony as a sanction for violation of a 
                                                                                                             
 159 See United States v. Cloughessy, No. 77-1015, 572 F.2d 190, 191-92 (9th Cir. 
1977) (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
 160 Hecht, Diamond & Greenfield v. Rosen, No. 84-6270, 790 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(unpublished table decision) (Wiggins, J., dissenting). 
 161 See United States v. Alvarez-Rubalcava, No. 74-3353, 556 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 
1977) (unpublished table decision) (Hufstedler, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 162 See United States v. Boni, No. 74-2174, 566 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(unpublished table decision) (Ely, J., concurring). Judges Ely and (then District Judge) 
Pregerson had initially dismissed a case as non-appealable but had stated that the district 
judge had been correct in invalidating a statute concerning federal courts’ jurisdiction 
over Native Americans. The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Wilson, 420 
U.S. 332 (1975), concerning the government’s ability to appeal in certain cases, 
“indicate[d] that the majority was mistaken in its original disposition,” so the previous 
appellate ruling had to be vacated, but Judge Ely hoped the district judge would take the 
delay into account with respect to petitioner’s speedy trial rights. Id. 
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discovery order, but Judge Poole was not convinced that the jury would 
have convicted if it had heard the excluded evidence and supported his 
position with Fifth and First Circuit cases holding the exclusion of such 
mistaken identity evidence not harmless, as well as a Ninth Circuit case 
which found such exclusion an abuse of discretion requiring reversal.163 
Publication would also have been appropriate where the dissenter saw 
the majority opinion as “patently inconsistent” with a recent Ninth 
Circuit en banc, and the majority responded in a dozen-line footnote.164 
This is the sort of case that is grist for the mill for those who say that 
unpublished memorandums are used to “bury” an appellate court’s 
inconsistent rulings; in any event, the exchange among the judges as to 
the meaning of the recent en banc opinion would likely have aided others 
attempting to apply that ruling. 
The “subtle interactive process among three repeat players” that 
characterizes within-panel interaction in the courts of appeals means that 
“appellate judges may occasionally agree that if an opinion remains 
unpublished they will forgo their inclination to dissent,”165 and former 
D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Wald has said that “wily would-be dissenters 
go along with a result they do not like as long as it is not elevated to a 
precedent.”166 This suggests a possible strategic relationship between 
dissent and publication, seen in a judge’s observation that “if there is a 
published opinion on the request for counsel issue, I will have to 
dissent.”167 
The relationship is revealed even more clearly in debate over a case 
on denial of asylum and withholding of deportation for a Nicarauguan 
mother and minor child.168 A proposed memorandum disposition 
overturning the denial was circulated initially, with another judge telling 
the author, “I don’t see any reason to publish and strongly prefer that the 
disposition remain a memodispo.” However, at conference, the author 
changed his mind about publication and indicated that he would 
recirculate it, with publication appropriate “because there are no cases 
that deal with the INS’s burden of proof after a petitioner established past 
persecution.” The colleague, who would not grant asylum to opponents 
                                                                                                             
 163 Frederick v. Warwzeszack, No. 85-1792, 792 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(unpublished table decision) (Poole, J., dissenting). 
 164 United States v. Sibley, No. 72-3178, 73-1496 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 1977) (Chambers, 
J., dissenting). 
 165 James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Designated Diffidence: District Court Judges 
on the Courts of Appeals, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 565, 582 (2001). 
 166 Id. at 582 n.36. 
 167  See supra note 19. 
 168 Referencing Gutierrez v. INS, No. 95-70053, 95 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(unpublished table decision). 
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of a now overthrown regime without proof that they still were 
persecuted, now conditioned his vote on nonpublication. He was “willing 
to let the petitioner stay and perhaps to withhold dissent if the disposition 
were not published, but “a vigorous dissent” would accompany 
publication; nonetheless he noted that the author had the “prerogative” to 
publish. The third panel member first joined the author on the merits and 
suggested “that we dispose of the matter with an unpublished 
disposition,” but later indicated a willingness to “go along with 
publication because I would like to read [the] dissent.” When, before 
drafting a dissent, the putative dissenter tried to confirm that the author 
still held to publishing, the latter finally withdrew, saying the disposition 
would be filed as a memorandum.169 
An exchange in the Eleventh Circuit also illustrates how the 
publication of a ruling can become a matter of court politics. After a 
disposition with a separate opinion, an off-panel judge wrote to the 
panel: “I cannot understand why [this case] was not published. 
I cannot recall an occasion when an opinion from a divided court 
went unpublished, except in one or two rare instances when the 
judges differed on a finding of fact and the opinion contained 
nothing of substance regarding the law. Here, much is said 
regarding points of law that are of importance to the court.170  
Responding, a judge asked whether the circuit had “some written rule or 
perhaps unwritten ‘tribal law’ that mandates that our opinion be 
published when a judge dissents” and said he knew “of no such rule or 
policy.” Not satisfied, the off-panel judge indicated an intention to seek 
en banc rehearing, and tried to force publication, saying, “If the panel’s 
decision is not published, I shall attach it to my dissenting opinion as an 
appendix.” A member of the panel, in addition to asking why someone 
would want a thoroughly disliked opinion published, emphasized that 
publishing a previously unpublished disposition as an appendix to a 
dissent to a denial of rehearing en banc posed a serious institutional 
issue. However, the threat was carried out. The court denied en banc 
rehearing, and the off-panel judge dissented at length to the denial, 
adding the (previously) unpublished ruling as an appendix to his 
dissent.171  
                                                                                                             
 169 Referencing id. 
 170 See Riley v. Camp, No. 94-9118, 84 F.3d 437 (11th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table 
decision) (Kravitch, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 171 See Riley v. Camp, 130 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 1997) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
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III. OTHER ELEMENTS AND NORMS 
In addition to formal guidelines for publication and the criteria 
embedded in them, other norms or desiderata also come into play. Some 
are easily identifiable, perhaps because, like publication of reversals, 
they are part of other circuits’ formal rules. In such situations, one can 
talk of courts that are “reported to have adopted such a policy in 
practice,” as was the case with the Ninth Circuit and intercircuit conflict 
cases.172 In addition, an observer can construct categories of cases in 
which use of unpublished dispositions is sufficiently regular to infer the 
presence of an implicit norm, such as instances in which jurisdiction or 
aspects of justiciability such as mootness keep the court from reaching 
the merits, or where the court deals with non-final/non-dispositive 
matters so that the case is therefore not appealable. 
A. Jurisdiction 
Relatively obvious candidates for unpublished dispositions are 
instances in which jurisdiction or aspects of justiciability keeps the court 
from reaching the merits. A ruling spelling out why the court lacks 
appellate jurisdiction might be a candidate for publication to assist 
prospective parties as to the rules for bringing an appeal, and fleshing out 
conclusory statements about the absence of jurisdiction might help 
explain the law on the subject. However, if the court of appeals cannot 
reach the merits for obvious jurisdictional reasons, an unpublished 
disposition may be sufficient to dispose of the case, as when there had 
been judgment below on only one of several claims and no district court 
certification for a non-delayed appeal; there the judges, while mentioning 
the issue of whether never-served “parties” are in a case for Rule 54(b)173 
purposes and cited Second and Third Circuit cases to the effect they are 
not, but they said, “We need not address this issue” because of the claims 
not yet adjudicated.174 This avoided the problem of having to publish 
because that issue was one of first impression in the circuit. 
Another instance of use of an unpublished disposition on 
jurisdictional matters came when the court of appeals considered the 
dismissal of a suit over recoupment of overpaid disability benefits.175 The 
judges found mootness as to two of the three claims because the 
                                                                                                             
 172 Stienstra, supra note 12 (emphasis added). 
 173  FED. R. CIV. PRO. 54(b). 
 174 Great W. Sav. v. United States, No. 83-6183, 755 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(unpublished table decision). “Tempted as we might be to rule on the merits of the bank’s 
argument, we must restrain ourselves.” Id. 
 175 See Easley v. Heckler, 84-2825, 787 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table 
decision). 
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Secretary of Health and Human Services had paid the contested amount 
and waived the right to recoup overpayment, and found a lack of 
jurisdiction as to the other because of sovereign immunity, a proposition 
for which two Supreme Court cases were cited.176 Also related to 
jurisdiction was a ruling holding that a plaintiff trying to challenge a 
welfare regulation that a terminated general assistance beneficiary, to 
retain benefits pending appeal, must file a notice of appeal within ten 
days of the termination notice, lacked standing for having filed within the 
proper time, so the district court judgment invalidating the regulation 
thus had to be vacated.177 
 Unpublished dispositions also were frequently used when the 
judges lacked appellate jurisdiction, for example, because the judgment 
below was non-final and thus not appealable, as when a district court had 
found 42 U.S.C. § 1983 defendants immune but had dismissed without 
prejudice, a non-final order.178 In such cases, an appeal would be 
available after a new judgment and new notice of appeal.179 
B. “Not the Right Vehicle” 
There are instances when publication might be appropriate under 
the circuit’s guidelines but other concerns stand in the way. The judges 
may feel that the issues have not been satisfactorily briefed, perhaps 
because appellant is pro se, or that there are some other complications. 
Thus in a complex immigration case, although one panel member 
preferred publication because he did not like to have complicated issues 
appear in unpublished memoranda, another judge wanted the disposition 
to remain unpublished because the petitioner had been uncounseled and 
the issues had not been briefed.180 Some Ninth Circuit judges preferred 
not to deal with issues of first impression in cases that had been disposed 
of by screening panels,181 perhaps because the matters had not been 
                                                                                                             
 176 See id.  On mootness, see also Bast v. Gov’t of Guam, No. 72-1135 (9th Cir. May 
14, 1973).  
 177 See Bustamante v. Jamieson, No. 84-1776, 758 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 178 See Renaud v. Phelan, No. 84-1926, 760 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished 
table decision). 
 179 See e.g., Hancock Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Co., 72-1323 (9th Cir. Nov. 
12, 1973). 
 180 Referencing Gutierrez-Tavares v. INS, 92 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 181 Cases given the lowest (lightest) “case-weights” by staff attorneys are sent to 
three-panel screening panels, which dispose of cases with aid of staff attorneys, who have 
prepared proposed memorandum dispositions in lieu of bench memoranda. If the judges 
are on a screening panel because a case is more complex than is appropriate for 
disposition before them, they can “reject” a case, that is, send it to a regular argument 
panel. 
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argued, and did not think such cases to be good vehicles for publishing. 
However, as one judge who told his colleagues that he had “always been 
reluctant to publish screening decisions on first impression issues for the 
circuit” nonetheless agreed to publish one ruling because “we have clear 
guidance from other circuits” on the Sentencing Guidelines issue in the 
case, and another because “the issue is fairly straightforward, and oral 
arguments are precluded because the pro se plaintiff is a prisoner.”182 
When the court of appeals’ ruling will apply to only a limited 
number of people, it may not be thought to warrant publication, just as 
the Supreme Court generally does not grant certiorari when a case 
applies to only a few individuals. Thus when a case is really more about 
individuals’ benefits and less about a broader legal issue, a memorandum 
disposition will suffice. We see this when, after termination of pilots 
when they reached the maximum age for pilots and most had been 
rehired in the different position of flight engineer, two remaining 
plaintiffs had likewise been rehired after filing suit and their pension was 
the only remaining issue.183 With an issue of limited long-term effect that 
was also not likely to recur and that involved only two people, 
publication seemed unnecessary. 
Issuing a ruling in an unpublished disposition because of its limited 
effect also took place when the court dealt with transitional 
circumstances, for example, correction of sentence where a new statute 
carried less stringent penalties (and the possibility of probation) than did 
the one used to sentence the defendant.184 A published disposition would 
have added to circuit law on the conditions under which district judges 
could grant motions to correct sentences and could also have cast light on 
the interplay of the new statutes, but the judges might have believed that 
an unpublished disposition was sufficient, as fewer such cases would 
occur as sentencing took place under the new statutes, and the fact 
situation was complex, making it unlikely to recur. Another situation that 
was highly unusual — not likely to recur, highly fact-bound, and for 
which an unpublished disposition was used was a dispute over a 
protective order and discovery orders — arose in a suit by Varig Airlines 
against Boeing, in which the panel issued mandamus to the district court 
to sort out “the misunderstanding and confusion” caused by the latter’s 
“own regrettable and informal method of operation” in handling matters 
                                                                                                             
 182  See supra note 19. 
 183 Referencing Penton v. Flying Tiger Line, No. 85-5945, 788 F.2d 1566 (9th Cir. 
1986) (unpublished table decision). 
 184 Referencing United States v. Gaglie, No. 72-2632 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 1973). 
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before it.185 As the panel observed, “The unfortunate chain of events 
leading to this Petition are so singularly unique that we cannot conceive 
that the situation will ever again be duplicated.”186 
Another aspect of the “proper vehicle” question is that some courts 
of appeals apparently have an inclination to wait for other cases raising 
the issue, much as the Supreme Court denies certiorari in order to allow 
an issue to “percolate.” Thus at least one court, faced with a case 
containing a new point of law in the circuit — something that would 
require the Ninth Circuit and most other appellate courts to publish — 
nonetheless is said to follow the practice of not publishing on the point at 
issue until it sees what other circuits are doing.187 And percolation may 
be involved in the alleged practice in which the Third Circuit used 
judgment orders to deal with complex cases.188 
C. Diversity Jurisdiction/State Law 
One aspect of jurisdiction related to non-publication is the federal 
court’s diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Cases that come to the 
federal courts in this way are among those most likely not to be 
published because the judges, who seek to be less intrusive in 
interpreting state law, realize their rulings on state law are “good law” 
only until state appellate courts decide the point at issue. An authoritative 
decision on the subject by the state’s highest court then immediately 
displaces federal court interpretation, so that the federal court, as one 
judge put it, “has written in disappearing ink.”189 The same may be true 
with respect to other types of cases based on state law, such as federal 
tort actions brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Thus, as 
one judge observed in recommending against publication, “We should 
leave such questions in the state courts where possible” and should not 
publish if the case “simply involves interpreting state insurance law”; 
were the case to involve “novel questions of federal law,” however, 
publication might be in order.190 
                                                                                                             
 185 Referencing S.A. Empresa De Viacao Area Rio Granense (Varig Airlines) v. U.S. 
Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Wash. (Boeing Co. and Weber Aircraft Corp., real parties in 
interest), No. 77-1677, 568 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1977) (unpublished table decision). 
 186  Id. 
 187 I am indebted to Wayne Logan for this information. 
 188 See generally Gulati & McCauliff, On Not Making Law, supra note 17. 
 189 Commenting on a Ninth Circuit colleague, Judge David Thompson said, “Judge 
Goodwin feels that if it’s an issue of state law, it should never be published.” Open 
Forum on Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, Aug. 17, 1997, Portland, 
Oregon (notes on file with author). 
 190 Referencing Lunsford v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., No. 91-16536 (9th Cir. Oct. 
10, 1994) (Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to panel). After a request for redesignation, the 
memorandum disposition was published as an opinion, 18 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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 An example of non-publication when the decision rested 
fundamentally on the judges’ reading of state law is the disposition in a 
suit to divide gambling proceeds, which the district court had dismissed 
as a suit to enforce an illegal agreement.191 Identifying the issue as which 
state’s law is to be applied as to the enforceability of agreements, the 
court of appeals parsed Nevada law and found that a betting pool was 
illegal everywhere, including Nevada, but said that Nevada enforced 
betting pool agreements to place wagers at licensed casinos and share the 
proceeds.192  Even when state law is explored in some detail, as was done 
in Kent, with copious citation to cases and analysis of what those cases 
require, the disposition is likely to remain unpublished because the 
federal court is not the final authority on state law. Alternatively, the 
ruling may be seen as an application of law as the federal court finds it 
and not appropriate for publication for that reason. If the question in the 
unpublished memorandum were one of federal rather than state law, the 
dispositions would likely look more like a published opinion than if only 
state law is involved.193 
 Another instance of a memorandum disposition that was an 
exposition and application of state law was a ruling, on a forfeiture 
action against a plane, that drew heavily on state law.194 Reversing the 
district court for a clearly erroneous finding because “uncontroverted 
evidence establishes Bowman’s liability for intentional interference with 
contractual relations” and basing its discussion on California law, the 
court of appeals looked at each of five bases of liability, devoting a short 
paragraph to one and as much as two-and-one-half pages to the most 
central element on which liability was found, and also devoted a 
paragraph to affirmative defenses. The result was a nine-page 
memorandum disposition, the civil equivalent of a multi-issue criminal 
case that has a long memodispo because at least some time is devoted to 
each of a number of issues. There was also a concurrence, by (then) 
Judge Kennedy, but, like the majority opinion, it was based on California 
law.195 
Another such unpublished disposition came in an appeal from a 
$65,000 judgment for a distributor who had sued Frito-Lay for breach of 
contract, where the court of appeals said that the district judge had made 
                                                                                                             
 191 Kent v. Mindlin, No. 93-17286, 106 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table 
decision). 
 192  Id. 
 193 See, e.g., Nationwide Mortgage Servs. v. Inv. Mortgage Int’l, No. 84-1691, 758 
F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision). 
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a clearly erroneous finding that Frito-Lay had waived its right to 
terminate the relationship without cause on notice.196 The court devoted 
more than four pages to the state law issues at the heart of the case, 
whether “election of remedies” applied; while much of this discussion 
was fact-based, also included was a page-long discussion of election of 
remedies doctrine and of criticism made of it, along with citation to cases 
showing its use instead of estoppel and res judicata.197 
D. Application of Existing Law 
If it is most important that the judges follow the guideline calling 
for publication of cases involving matters of law of first impression in 
the circuit, cases in which the court of appeals, instead of announcing a 
new rule, is only applying an existing rule are legitimately issued as 
unpublished dispositions; an extensive opinion is said not to be needed if 
the law to be applied is straightforward, and the Ninth Circuit has long 
been among those courts which “do not necessarily publish these 
decisions.”198 The general notion is that unpublished dispositions are to 
be used in cases that break no new ground and thus do not pronounce 
new circuit precedent, and particularly to dispose of cases applying 
existing law to uncomplicated fact patterns. We can see this in the 
judge’s comment that “the disposition of this appeal requires no more 
than an unpublished memorandum, as the result reached . . . involves a 
routine application of our asylum law.”199 
Of course, “application” to one person is interpretation or “rule-
development” to another, and some see an application of a rule to new 
facts as developing precedent, thus requiring publication.200 Among the 
latter type of situations are those involving use of Supreme Court 
decisions. For example, in deciding an appeal by a doctor charged with 
issuing methadone for non-medical reasons,201 the judges said that doubts 
raised by a dissent in an earlier ruling against claims about the statute’s 
                                                                                                             
 196 See Balding v. Frito-Lay Inc., No. 84-1816, 758 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 197  See id. 
 198 Stienstra, supra note 12, at 36. 
 199 Rivera-Moreno v. INS, 213 F.3d 481, 487 (9th Cir. 2000) (Hawkins, J., concurring 
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coverage of “registered” physicians202 had been dispelled by a Supreme 
Court ruling203 which had noted the earlier case. Such an observation by 
the court of appeals judges should have been given greater notice 
through publication of the disposition. Likewise, publication might have 
been advisable when recent Supreme Court decisions disposed of a case 
dealing with a challenge to a transfer between prisons.204 Although the 
judges observed, “Recent Supreme Court decisions in Meachum v. Fano 
(1976), and Montanye v. Haymes (1976), foreclose Rodriguez’s claim 
that his due process was violated by being denied counsel at his prison 
transfer hearing,” apparently a straight-forward matter not demanding 
publication, the panel found a potential problem with the district court’s 
dismissal of the prisoner’s claim about confinement in administrative 
segregation.205 In reversing and remanding for further proceedings, the 
judges went on to suggest how the new rulings might apply: “For due 
process to attach, Meachum and Montanye teach that an action by prison 
officials must deprive a prisoner of an interest in liberty rooted either 
solely in the Constitution or in applicable state law operating in 
conjunction with the Constitution.”206 Publication of that application 
would have aided development of circuit precedent. 
Non-publication even of reversals regularly takes place when the 
result appears quite clear to the court and the ruling is a straightforward 
application of circuit precedent. From the early years of regular use of 
unpublished dispositions, one can find instances in which precedent was 
clear, so that the only question was whether the law had been properly 
applied.  For example, publication was not necessary when the court of 
appeals, relying on a case from the prior year, reversed a continuing 
criminal enterprise (CCE) conviction and a firearms count dependent on 
it because the jury had not been properly instructed as to whether an 
individual was supervised by the defendant when, as a matter of law, that 
person was not within the defendant’s supervision.207 In this reversal, use 
of a memorandum disposition was acceptable because there was 
recently-issued circuit precedent and the court had also warned the 
parties of its applicability. And, in another instance, a panel, citing more 
                                                                                                             
 202 Id. (citing United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1975) (MacKinnon 
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than one circuit ruling on several of the points, used an unpublished 
disposition to reverse and remand when a district judge made a series of 
errors as to a defendant’s mental capacity.208 That the district judge was 
one with whom the circuit had had difficulty may also explain the non-
publication; the judge had not changed over time, and a published 
opinion would not likely have had much effect. 
Among the situations in which the application of existing law is at 
issue, so that unpublished dispositions are regularly used, are those in 
which the district court has wide discretion and the reviewing court finds 
no abuse of discretion. An early example was an affirmance of the 
district court’s dismissal of a case for plaintiff’s inactivity.209 When the 
court, finding no serious problem with a jury verdict, reverses the district 
court’s grant of a new trial as abuse of discretion and directs entry of 
judgment on the jury verdict, publication also is not necessary.210 While 
such cases could in some circumstances mark out the boundary of the 
trial judge’s discretion, making them appropriate for publication, in most 
instances involving district court discretion, there are no “boundary” 
issues because the resolution is not a close call. 
E. Frivolous Cases 
Somewhat related to application of the law are frivolous cases, for 
which unpublished memoranda are quite likely to be used. They are 
frivolous in part because the legal answer to the question posed is so 
obvious that application of the legal rule is virtually automatic. When the 
court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, there is little 
reason to publish it unless the judges are identifying a particular element 
as being frivolous as a matter of law or are stating some new element of 
the law of sanctions. The same is true when the appeals court affirms a 
district court ruling dismissing a claim as frivolous. 
Unpublished dispositions are used when the court is faced with 
certain types of frivolous claims to which it would not wish to give 
publicity, such as baseless claims against the tax system.  Apart from the 
fact that if an argument is frivolous, discussion of it would add nothing to 
the law, publishing the ruling would provide publicity to the litigant. 
Faced with a claim that wages were not constitutionally taxable, the 
court, citing two Ninth Circuit cases, devoted one paragraph each to 
federal officials’ immunity and the Tax Injunction Act, and said, “This 
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claim has been repeatedly rejected,” and assessed costs and attorney fees 
for bringing a frivolous case.211 Likewise, when the claim was that wages 
were not income subject to the income tax, the judges found that the 
required administrative claim had not been made.212 Complaining about 
frivolous cases, they said, “Meritless appeals of this nature clog the court 
and serve no purpose for the parties,” and assessed double costs and 
$1,500 for attorney fees.213 
Particularly where the party making the frivolous argument is a 
“frequent filer,” the last thing the judges wish to do is give that 
individual the spotlight; frivolous matters brought by such litigants are 
slapped down in unpublished memoranda. An example is the person who 
brought numerous challenges to denial of his bar application, in one of 
which the court found no district court jurisdiction over the claim 
because it was a challenge not to general rules but to the state supreme 
court’s decision on an individual action.214 Moreover, the court of 
appeals found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s injunction 
against filing additional suits and found it acceptable to give the 
defendants attorney fees for a groundless action, to which they added 
attorney fees for a frivolous appeal.215 
The court of appeals also affirmed an injunction against the filing 
of more suits by another “frequent filer” unless the cases were signed by 
an attorney. Ruling in nine consolidated cases brought against Supreme 
Court justices, four district judges, eight state court judges, prosecutors, 
and others, the Ninth Circuit found the district court’s total ban on all pro 
se claims too broad, and thus required modification of the injunction, but 
only as to the defendants against whom the plaintiff could not file.216 
There could be no further harassing lawsuits, but the plaintiff could file 
in “other legitimate unrelated disputes.” Nonetheless, there was no 
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question about the judges’ view of the filings: “These lawsuits are a 
flagrant and repeated attempt to abuse the judicial process by suing 
judges . . . who have participated in previous civil actions” involving the 
plaintiff.217 When the same plaintiff sued Washington’s Attorney General 
for not bringing criminal charges against state judicial officers, the court 
of appeals likewise affirmed the district court’s finding that the suit was 
frivolous, disposing of the appeal in an unpublished memorandum by 
saying briefly that the district court was not required to state detailed 
reasons for granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss.218 
Another candidate for nonpublication is a case with a claim or set 
of claims that may have no basis, even if the judges don’t find them 
frivolous. Unless the judges create new rules to “put someone out of 
court,” such cases are not likely to require publication. In one such case, 
a challenge to a district court dismissal of a petition to quash IRS 
summons, where the claim was that the district court should have held an 
evidentiary hearing, the appeals court, quoting the statute as to limits on 
who received notice, said that the individual involved was not entitled to 
notice of the summons and could not bring an action to quash.219 Thus 
the district court’s dismissal was affirmed.  
F. Fact-Based Rulings 
In many instances of applying law, the facts are dominant. This is 
one reason dispositions applying the law are not published. More 
generally, cases requiring review of a district court’s or agency’s 
interpretation of facts in relation to some standard often result in fact-
based rulings. These are candidates for release as memorandum 
dispositions because the rulings are of minimal broader applicability. As 
a judge observed in one case, “This seemed to me to be such a fact-
specific case that an opinion was not warranted.” In another case, in 
rejecting a colleague’s suggestion of publication, a judge said, “This is a 
fact specific case that I do not believe would be of precedential value,” 
and, in still another case, the author, who had reported himself as leaning 
to an unpublished disposition, reported, “The panel was of the opinion 
that this is such a fact-specific case that we really do not need to 
publish.”220 
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One reason that heavily fact-specific cases are quite likely to 
receive an unpublished disposition is that the case could be decided 
“either way without changing the law of the circuit or creating an 
intercircuit conflict.”221 Although alteration of a rule would require 
publication, these cases may fall well within the zone of an existing rule, 
so that the decision is not seen as altering it. Where the new facts to 
which the rule is applied are at the margin so that the rule’s domain is 
affected, publication would be more likely, but it is less so when a 
litigant’s claim is not close to the boundary. If one’s view of change in 
the law is that application of a rule to a new set of facts does not alter the 
rule itself, publication is not necessary. If, however, one takes the view 
that application of a legal rule to a new set of facts — its extension to 
those facts — itself alters the rule, then publication of the resulting 
disposition would be in order. Thus perhaps the Ninth Circuit should not 
have used a memorandum disposition to distinguish a defendant’s case 
from a recent Supreme Court ruling, as that distinction may have made 
the coverage of the Supreme Court ruling clearer and perhaps prevented 
similar claims.222 
The fact-basis of unpublished rulings can be seen in cases involving 
contract interpretation, which depend on the specific wording of the 
contract. An example is a reversal, as either a clearly erroneous factual 
holding or an error of law, of a district court’s finding that an (illegal) 
agreement to sell securities was severable from an agreement to provide 
legal services.223  Use of an unpublished disposition was appropriate on 
the basis that severability was a state law issue; the issue was also 
heavily fact-based, and the memorandum contained little discussion of 
law except at one point, on the primary purpose of the agreement.224 
Likewise, the court’s reading of a trust deed to determine whether it 
transferred all real property interest in the land, rather than only the legal 
title to land, was a factual matter not requiring publication of the 
disposition.225 Another fact-heavy case typical of those in which 
unpublished dispositions are used was one in which the judges, affirming 
the denial of Conscientious Objector status to a serviceman, searched the 
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record with respect to the sincerity of his claim.226 Another fact-based 
case, a copyright case in which the plaintiff claimed his movie idea was 
stolen, involved the question of similarity; this resulted in a nine-page 
disposition, in which the only law discussed was the use of summary 
judgment in such situations.227 
 Certain types of cases usually are fact-based and thus appear 
regularly as unpublished dispositions. Among them are immigration 
cases. Claims of persecution in applications for asylum, for example, are 
fact-based although the question may be one of applying the standard to 
be satisfied before asylum is to be granted.228 Criminal cases involving 
the question of an adequate basis for probable cause are another type; 
whether an officer had sufficient basis for probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion in connection with a search or stop is usually fact-based.229 
Another circuit’s chief judge has said that his experience led him to 
consider that “prime candidates for unpublished opinions are Social 
Security, Black Lung, and criminal cases as well as prisoner 
petitioners,”230 all of which, particularly the first two, share the 
characteristic of being fact-based. 
Also usually fact-based and thus usually not requiring publication 
are Social Security disability benefits cases. However, there are instances 
where one might question use of a memorandum disposition in such a 
case, such as a case in which the majority and the dissenter disagreed 
over what a Ninth Circuit case required of an administrative law judge in 
evaluating evidence in certain situations.231 The majority found a remand 
was in order for development of a proper record “and to afford the ALJ 
an opportunity to more thoroughly evaluate the petitioner’s disability and 
to make further findings” because a Ninth Circuit case required a specific 
finding about the diagnosis, while Judge Wallace, dissenting, said the 
same Ninth Circuit case did not give presumptive weight to a treating 
doctor’s report; moreover, he would not remand under it because the 
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ALJ’s ruling came before the case was decided.232 To be sure, the 
dissent, which found that substantial evidence supported the ALJ, was 
partly fact-based, and the case had not concluded because the majority 
remanded, but the disagreement over what the disputed case required 
should have suggested that publication was appropriate. Similarly, when 
the Third Circuit, finding no substantial evidence to support the Social 
Security Commissioner’s determination concerning an individual’s level 
of education, remanded for reconsideration in a fact-based ruling, its 
discussion of the presumption that between completion of the sixth grade 
meant a marginal education might be thought to cast light on the law, 
which should have led to publication.233 
G. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Among fact-specific cases appropriate for unpublished dispositions 
are those in which the basic question is the sufficiency of the evidence. 
Use of unpublished dispositions in such situations can be seen regularly 
when the appellant in a criminal case claims that evidence was not 
sufficient to sustain a conviction.234 If an unpublished disposition is 
acceptable when the court affirms on the basis that the evidence was 
sufficient, an unpublished disposition may likewise be acceptable even 
when the court reverses for insufficiency of the evidence, as when a 
panel majority, providing a paragraph of explanation, reversed for 
insufficiency of the evidence, over a dissent in which the dissenting 
judge spelled out at length why the evidence was sufficient to sustain the 
conviction.235 One might question this failure to publish a reversal 
accompanied by a dissent, but nonpublication might be appropriate 
where the disagreement was only over the sufficiency of the evidence, 
not the applicable law. 
Use of memorandum dispositions when sufficiency of the evidence 
is at issue occurs not only in criminal cases but also in civil ones, such as 
those concerning Social Security disability benefits. Where agency 
rulings, to which considerable deference is shown, are being reviewed 
and the only issue is whether there was substantial evidence in the record 
to support the agency decision, publication is unlikely.236 However, two 
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matters weigh in favor of publishing rulings enforcing or denying 
enforcement of agency rulings. One is that agency decisions are 
published in formal agency dockets or in specialized commercial 
reporters and thus fit the court’s criterion of publication when a case is 
“published below.” The other is that, because these rulings are far less 
visible than the district courts’ rulings, when the courts of appeals review 
of the agency rulings, publication would assist in holding the agency 
accountable. Cases from the NLRB also are often fact-based, particularly 
when the issue is whether there was substantial evidence to support the 
Board’s result. Thus, in one case, where there was no challenge to the 
Board’s legal analysis but only to the evidence supporting its 
conclusions, the court used a memorandum disposition in ruling that 
there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings that 
General Counsel had made out a prima facie case, which had not been 
rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.237 
Related to non-publication of such fact-based reversals are those 
cases which result in unpublished rulings because as one judge stated, 
“the district court really did have unresolved fact questions which it 
erroneously disposed of in a summary judgment.” In one example, the 
court of appeals said a union seeking arbitration claimed an oral 
modification of the bargaining agreement, which was allowed under 
Ninth Circuit law, and the possible existence of the modification was a 
material fact about which there was a dispute, requiring reversal of the 
summary judgment.238 Other circuits do this as well. Thus the Sixth 
Circuit did not publish when it vacated and remanded after finding a 
factual dispute over when an employee told the employer of the need for 
leave – a question relevant to basing summary judgment on the statute of 
limitations, and the basis for summary judgment,239 and the Tenth Circuit 
used an unpublished disposition to remand because certain fact issues 
remained in a case.240 
Using an unpublished disposition to reverse a grant of summary 
judgment may be sensible because the ruling establishes only that there 
is a dispute as to material facts, with further action necessary in the case. 
Not only is the judges’ determination itself fact-bound, but it will be 
soon enough for the court of appeals to publish the case upon dealing 
with legal issues when the case reappears on appeal after the district 
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judge applies the law to disputed facts. Certainly when the appeals court 
found a factual dispute where the district court, to grant summary 
judgment, had seen none, reversal by unpublished disposition seems 
reasonable as the matter will proceed toward trial. Unpublished 
dispositions also seem appropriate when reversal of summary judgment 
comes because the plaintiff had not been given a real opportunity to 
respond to defendant’s summary judgment motion. For example, the 
Ninth Circuit used an unpublished disposition when an incarcerated 
prisoner who, the court noted, had regularly tried to comply with Court 
rules, was not given a real opportunity to respond to defendant’s motion 
because of the prisoner’s changing address, to which the district court 
paid insufficient attention.241 However, if instead of only overturning a 
summary judgment, where the case then remains to be tried, the court 
grants a summary judgment to the other side, publication might be 
thought more appropriate. 
IV. OTHER ELEMENTS II: REVERSALS 
There are several principal reasons supporting publication of 
reversals. One is that disagreement among judges over an issue, even if 
“vertical” disagreement between levels of the court system, indicates that 
the law is uncertain, and uncertainty is said to require debate in public. 
Another that deference to the trial court or agency requires providing a 
public explanation for such action, and the legal community, in 
particular, deserves an explanation of the reversal. The rationale for a 
published opinion in reversals is, however, undercut, at least in part, by 
the relative ease with which these dispositions can be retrieved 
electronically or found in Federal Appendix. 
Although it has been the case that no circuit “unequivocally 
requires publication when the decision is a reversal of a lower court or 
agency decision,”242 some circuits have an explicit guideline that 
dispositions ought to be published if the court is reversing a district 
court’s or agency’s ruling. On the basis of interviews, the 1985 Federal 
Judicial Center study indicated, that the Ninth Circuit’s “judges do not 
necessarily designate these decisions for publication.”243 However, this 
seems to be the most obvious of the court’s desiderata for publication not 
explicit in its Local Rules. 
By far the largest proportion of “unpublished” dispositions have 
been affirmances, so labeled — whether in Federal Reporter tables of 
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unpublished cases or cases printed in Federal Appendix. If we add 
dispositions equivalent to “Affirmed,” such as “Enforcement Granted” 
(for National Labor Relations Board cases) or “petition denied” (for 
cases from the INS and some other agencies), as well as mandamus 
denied and most “dismissals,” many of which go to the merits,244 there 
are very few dispositions in which the lower court or agency is not 
upheld. What then about those cases with unpublished dispositions in 
which the lower court or agency judgment is disturbed in some way?245 
Official data indicate that for all dispositions on the merits from 
statistical year (“SY”) 1998 through SY 2001, whether published or not, 
all courts of appeals were reversed or vacated at the rate of 10.4 percent 
for 1997-1998 and at rates ranging from 9.1 percent to 9.5 percent for the 
next three years.246 These data show that the Ninth Circuit’s variation for 
1998-2001 was greater than for other circuits, ascending from 7.3 percent 
in 1997-1998 to 9.4 percent in 2000-2001; for the first two years, the 
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Ninth Circuit’s reversal rate was below the overall figure, but it was 
roughly the same for the two more recent years. If all categories of 
dispositions not fully sustaining the lower court are included, the rate at 
which the courts of appeals disturb lower court or agency dispositions is 
much greater. For part of 2002, for example, for all courts of appeals 
somewhat more than half (56.4%) of the published rulings in 300 - 304 
Federal Reporter upheld the lower court or agency.247 The affirmance 
rates for most circuits ranged from just below half (the Sixth and 
Eleventh Circuits, each at 49%) to 60 percent. The Seventh Circuit had 
the highest proportion of published rulings that do not disturb the lower 
court (78.7%), with the Tenth Circuit also over 70 percent and the Eighth 
Circuit at two-thirds; the Ninth Circuit had the lowest proportion 
(44.3%). In cases from 2003 appearing in 320 - 324 Federal Reporter, 
the proportion of lower court rulings which the Ninth Circuit did not 
disturb was over half (54.8%), well below the proportion of such 
outcomes in unpublished dispositions. 
The picture for almost 2,200 Ninth Circuit unpublished dispositions 
in 2002 (29 - 44 Federal Appendix) is that the proportion of such 
dispositions in which lower courts’ or agencies’ rulings were left 
undisturbed remained comfortably over 80 percent for all except three 
volumes and only twice fell below three-quarters.248 A close-up picture is 
provided by 29 Federal Appendix, where the great majority of the 
dispositions for all circuits were affirmances, true, for example, of more 
than four-fifths of 96 Second Circuit cases and an even higher proportion 
from the Third Circuit.249 For the Ninth Circuit, a disproportionately high 
90 percent were affirmances; so were over 80 percent of the Eleventh 
Circuit’s listed cases. For the Sixth Circuit, three-fourths of the 36 
dispositions were affirmances or the equivalent, as were virtually all the 
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit dispositions.250 
In the next volume (30 Federal Appendix), the proportion of “non-
affirming” Ninth Circuit dispositions was much higher, exceeding one-
third (37%), while only one-eighth of Sixth Circuit dispositions 
overturned the ruling below, but the picture in other circuits was quite 
different. All eight D.C. Circuit dispositions were affirmances; in the 
Seventh Circuit all but one (an attorney discipline proceedings) were 
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affirmances or their equivalent, and all but one of 33 Eighth Circuit were 
affirmances. Although slightly less than one-half (123) of the 266 Fourth 
Circuit rulings were officially labeled “Affirmed,” an equal number were 
dismissals, mostly after the court had examined the merits; with other 
“Affirmed” equivalents added, less than four percent of lower court or 
agency rulings were disturbed. 
The proportion of Ninth Circuit non-affirmances remained over ten 
percent in subsequent Federal Appendix volumes; it was roughly 15 
percent in 31 and 32 Federal Appendix, before dipping slightly to 13 
percent (33 Federal Appendix), then rising substantially to 28 percent in 
34 Federal Appendix before declining to 19 percent (35 Federal 
Appendix), a higher proportion than or any other court of appeals with 
nontrivial numbers of dispositions. Affirmances and equivalents were 87 
percent of dispositions in both the Sixth and Tenth Circuits but a much 
higher 94.5 percent in the Fourth Circuit.251 This examination shows that 
overall the proportion of affirmances in published opinions is 
considerably lower than the proportion in unpublished memorandums; 
reversals certainly are more likely than affirmances to be published. The 
clear import of these data is that dispositions disturbing lower courts 
rulings are increasingly segregated in the Federal Reporter. 
The courts of appeals are more likely to affirm with respect to 
certain types of cases than others, so these cases make up a high 
proportion of unpublished dispositions. A very high proportion of 
unpublished dispositions are criminal appeals252 or habeas corpus 
petitions from state convictions, and in the dominant proportion of those, 
the courts of appeals affirm the conviction or the lower court denial of 
habeas corpus. Also appearing in considerable number are petitions in 
immigration cases where the INS has refused to grant asylum and 
ordered deportation. 
 In 1997-1998, when the reversal rate was 10.4 percent overall 
(both published and unpublished dispositions), it was 14.4 percent for 
administrative appeals and 15.2 percent for bankruptcy appeals, but only 
8.5 percent for criminal cases.253 Indeed, the rate of reversals regularly 
was the lowest for criminal appeals – as low as 5.4 percent in 1998-1999 
and 5.7 percent in 2000-2001. On the other hand, the rate of reversals 
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was regularly well above the average in administrative appeals and 
bankruptcy appeals (12.2% and 11.7%, respectively, in 2000-2001, and 
13.3% and 11.3% in 1998-1999). Prisoner petitions (10.7% in 2000-
2001, 11.3% in 1998-1999) and “other U.S. civil cases” (10.8% in 2000-
2001, 11.1% in 1999-2000, 11.8% in 1998-1998) also had above-average 
reversal rates. In the Ninth Circuit, where reversals certainly were more 
likely than affirmances to be published, the rate of reversals in criminal 
appeals was regularly well below the overall reversal rate and 
administrative appeals and other U.S. civil cases well above it; reversals 
in bankruptcy appeals were also well above the average in two of the 
four years. The widest swing can be found in prisoner petitions, well 
below the average in two years of the four (only 3.6% in 2000-2001 and 
4.9% in 1998-1999) but above the average in 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 
(11.6% and 13.5%, respectively). 
Differential application of criteria for publication between criminal 
cases and civil appeals is suggested by some judges’ belief – stated in 
comments to each other – that a disproportionate number of criminal 
appeals reversing the lower court are published, while most affirmances 
receive unpublished dispositions. Such action might have resulted from a 
belief that, just as some judges believe that oral argument should be 
granted in criminal appeals, it was important to show the world that the 
court was giving appropriate attention to criminal matters and 
appropriately protecting defendants’ rights. The “P.R.” element in this 
concern can, however, cut the other way, as when some judges 
questioned whether the impression from the published criminal cases, 
said to be unrepresentative, give the court a “bad rep” for being “soft on 
criminals.” Here there may have been an element of the need to indicate 
that, indeed, the Ninth Circuit did affirm convictions instead of “freeing 
criminals,” which would counter the impression created if reversals were 
more likely to result in published opinions and affirmances in not-for-
publication memorandum dispositions. Although some judges had 
argued “that the ‘public will know from reading the tables in the Federal 
Reporter that a great many cases are decided without published opinions 
and that the overwhelming majority are affirmed,’” a colleague 
responded that, even if “informed lawyers will have this information 
available . . . most people believe that courts are soft on crime.”254 It was 
therefore, he suggested, a “disservice” to the court not to publish “more 
of the significant cases in which we affirm convictions” in order not to 
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“further feed . . . a misguided impression that courts are soft on 
crime.”255 
A. Trends? 
What about changes over time in the publication of rulings 
disturbing lower court and agency rulings? As the proportion of 
“unpublished” cases has increased, we might find a smaller proportion of 
reversals among unpublished cases as the court used such dispositions 
for quick stamps of approval as it attempted to cope with caseload. At 
one time there may have been an assumption that reversals per se made 
law and thus should be published, while now it may be understood that a 
fact-based reversal no more requires publication than do other heavily 
fact-based dispositions.256 However, it might be more likely that an 
increased portion of memorandum dispositions would be reversals, as 
non-precedential dispositions, reversals included, are issued in more 
cases overall. Judges may feel that publishing explanations for reversals 
may not be important in all cases, particularly where the dispositions are 
now available in Federal Appendix or on-line, and that they are 
providing enough material, even if in an unpublished disposition, for use 
by the lower court or agency on remand so deficiencies in the earlier 
proceeding can be remedied. Here we might note that if the practice were 
changed to provide for publication of all dispositions other than full 
affirmances, the proportion of all cases receiving unpublished 
dispositions would not substantially increase, but the impression of a 
higher proportion of reversals would be created by published opinions. 
 The overall rate of court of appeals rulings disturbing the lower 
court or agency judgment has declined steadily if somewhat irregularly 
from the first half of the 1970s, when it was regularly close to one-fifth 
through the end of the century. For the 1970s, the proportion was 18.6 
percent; it was 16.9 percent for the 1980s; and it dropped below ten 
percent in the 1990s, staying below it as the century ended, with the 
overall percentage for the 1990-1999 decade less than half that for the 
1970s rate.257  
In Ninth Circuit unpublished “table” dispositions from October 
1985 through July 1990 (776 - 909 F.2d), lower court or agency 
judgments predominantly were left undisturbed, but in a significant 
proportion of these cases, the court of appeals nonetheless did disturb 
such judgments. There is variation over time, but the proportion of 
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 256 See discussion, supra at text accompanying notes 220-33. 
 257 Data in this and subsequent paragraphs collected by the author. 
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“undisturbed” dispositions is close to or exceeds 80 percent but seldom 
rises about 90 percent.258 Only seldom are less than 70 percent of the 
cases undisturbed, although at times it falls to between 75 and 80 
percent. For these unpublished dispositions, there is no steady overall 
trend during this period although the long-term pattern reveals some 
increase in the frequency with which the court of appeals makes an 
alteration in the lower court or agency ruling. 
Federal Judicial Center data show that in 1998, only 14 percent of 
the Ninth Circuit’s dispositions affirming were published but 53 percent 
of cases reversing the lower court or agency were published; for 
remands, the proportion was one-fifth.259 If we extend this examination, 
we find that in only half (50.9%) the cases the courts of appeals disposed 
of with published opinions in 305 - 346 F.3d were the district court or 
agency judgments “undisturbed,” distinctly lower than for cases with 
published opinions from 1973 – where 62.9 percent of the lower court or 
agency judgments were upheld or otherwise left alone. Yet even in the 
early years of the use of unpublished dispositions, cases in which they 
were used were more likely to result in affirmances or related 
dispositions; we see this in such cases from 1972-1977, when over three-
fourths (76.9%) were upheld. 
B. Reasons for Not Publishing 
A closer look at the reversals which received unpublished 
dispositions is now in order. If a presumption favors publication of 
rulings that disturb the lower court’s disposition, what can we make of 
such rulings issued as unpublished dispositions? Even if there is a lower 
proportion of reversals among unpublished dispositions than among 
published opinions, the issue is why there are any at all. We find that 
good reasons within the spirit of the court’s norms exist for not 
publishing most reversals which result in memorandum dispositions. 
Indeed, from the beginning, among the relatively few Ninth Circuit 
unpublished dispositions in which the court reversed in the early 1970s, 
there were instances where a not-for-publication disposition seemed 
appropriate. These included rulings modifying, remanding on 
                                                                                                             
 258 For “table” listings in Federal Reporter, captions (dispositions), not docket 
numbers, are counted, so consolidated cases — usually criminal cases with more than one 
defendant — count as one. Usually only two cases are consolidated as one, but in a case 
from the Tax Court, Boushey v. C.I.R., 932 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table 
decision), there are 31 docket numbers (90-79935 et seq.). Thus, if anything there is over-
counting: a bankruptcy case usually has two listings, one as “In re Jones,” the other as 
“Jones v. Smith”; matching of docket numbers to eliminate the duplication was not 
undertaken. 
 259 McKenna, supra note 9, at 19 (Table 11). 
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government concession of error, and reversing where retrial is necessary, 
which left matters open for later appellate examination. 
 Some particular types of rulings disturbing the lower court 
judgment where publication might seem unnecessary are quite evident. 
For example, a remand in a Rule 11 case, on a government concession at 
oral argument that an attorney had not reviewed one of the relevant 
documents before making a declaration, hardly required a published 
opinion,260 particularly where the court of appeals’ disposition does not 
further discuss the law.261 Going beyond such individual instances to 
look at those in 29 and 35 Federal Appendix, we find that among Ninth 
Circuit rulings in 29 Federal Appendix in which the judges vacated or 
reversed the lower court ruling in whole or in part, there were instances 
where the appeals court’s action was minor, as when an affirmance was 
accompanied by a sua sponte remand to exclude reference to a statutory 
provision,262 or when the court remanded only for deletion of a statutory 
reference in the judgment.263 
Only slightly more serious was a case where the court upheld the 
defendant’s conviction but reversed and remanded because the district 
court had not made factual findings with required specificity as to a 
sentence enhancement.264 In two other cases, however, the reversal was 
more significant. In one, the court held that a prisoner should be able to 
address directly those making decisions about him and remanded for a 
determination of the critical decision-makers and whether the prisoner 
had a meaningful opportunity to present his story to them.265 In the other, 
while ruling that not holding a hearing on admissibility and on 
prosecutorial misconduct was harmless error, the court reversed on the 
ground the district court’s jury instruction did not cover the defendant’s 
theory of the case, so that a retrial was necessary.266 
Ninth Circuit rulings in 30 Federal Appendix that were other than 
full affirmances included a remand for the relatively minor reasons that 
the judgment had to reflect conviction under a particular statutory 
proceeding when the district court accepted a guilty plea under Rule 
                                                                                                             
 260 See Clark v. United States, No. 85-2188, 792 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 261 See United States v. Jimenez-Gutierrez, 37 F. App’x 305 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing 
on government’s concession of error). 
 262 See United States v. Mejia-Plasencia, 29 F. App’x 444, 446 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 263 See United States v. Bernal-Portillo, 29 F. App’x 466, 468 (9th Cir. 2002).  
 264 See United States v. Blatt, 29 F. App’x 477, 480 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 265 See Castro v. Terhune, 29 F. App’x 463, 465 (9th Cir. 2002); the court disagreed 
with the prisoner on other claims. 
 266 See United States v. Williams, 29 F. App’x 486, 487-89 (9th Cir. 2002). 
98 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 2:041 
11267; there was also a dismissal and remand because of mootness as to 
one claim and lack of ripeness as to others.268 One reversal involved only 
an order taxing costs for the period before a case had been removed, in 
part because the order was contrary to a state court order.269 Several other 
reversals resulted from the appeals court’s determination that factual 
issues remained – as to the conclusion of a subcontractor’s obligations; 
the “reverse confusion” in a trademark case; and retaliation for 
complaining of discrimination.270 
Among other instances in which the lower court’s ruling was 
disturbed, one involved a partial reversal on the basis of error as to treble 
damages under New York law, with a remand to apply that law to 
punitive damages for a breach of fiduciary duties,271 and there was 
another partial reversal as to “unseaworthiness” resulting from a crew 
member’s character although the court found in error as to giving 
“maintenance and cure.”272 Among the many criminal cases disposed of 
by unpublished disposition, there was one in which the court found it 
was not harmless error to accept a guilty plea without informing the 
defendant he could not withdraw the plea if the judge rejected the 
sentencing recommendation,273 and a vacate-and-remand disposition 
when the judges found defendant entitled to a Franks hearing concerning 
a search warrant.274 
Unpublished memorandums are used in a number of situations 
when the court of appeals overturns the lower court ruling in whole or in 
part: 
• when clear circuit precedent is applied 
• when there has been an intervening relevant ruling or action 
• when technical matters must be attended to 
• when matters of procedure require remanding the case 
                                                                                                             
 267 See United States v. Cisneros-Vasquez, 30 F. App’x 696, 697 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 268 See Eggleston v. Pierce County, 30 F. App’x 721, 723 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 269 See Gardner v. Nike, 30 F. App’x 726, 728 (9th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit’s 
affirmance of the summary judgment in the case had been published. See Gardner v. 
Nike, 279 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 270 See United States ex rel. J & A Landscape Co. v. Reza, 30 F. App’x 708 (9th Cir. 
2002); M2 Software v. Viacom, 30 F. App’x 710, 712 (9th Cir. 2002) (with a one-
paragraph dissent by Judge Pregerson, who disagreed that trademark law extends to CD-
ROM products); Olson v. Teamsters Local No. 70, 30 F. App’x 718 (9th Cir. 2002) (a 
split decision in which the court affirmed on failure to show a breach of duty of fair 
representation). 
 271 See Bank Saderat Iran v. Telegen Corp., 30 F. App’x 741, 744-45 (9th Cir. 2002) 
 272 Torres v. Caribbean Fishing Co., Inc., 30 F. App’x 752, 753 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 273 United States v. Benitez, 30 F. App’x 706, 707-08 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 274  United States v. Flake, 30 F. App’x 736, 739 (9th Cir. 2002) (drawing a partial 
dissent by Judge Tallman, id. at 740-41, who found the evidence sufficient to support the 
warrant). 
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• when the ruling is fact-based, including reversal of summary 
judgment because of an issue of material fact 
 
Some of these elements have already been treated, but others require 
attention here. 
C. Intervening Ruling 
There may be no need to publish when the court of appeals reverses 
because of some intervening ruling, particularly a Ninth Circuit decision, 
handed down after the district court’s judgment. The district court’s 
ruling is wrong now given the changed law, but it was not wrong then, 
and because the intervening decision created circuit precedent, a 
following case could be unpublished. On the other hand, if application of 
the intervening ruling clearly makes new law, publication would be in 
order for that reason. However, when an intervening Supreme Court 
ruling requires reexamination of a lower court ruling and the 
distinguished district judge had done a fine job, the court might feel no 
need to use a published opinion to reverse.275 In one instance, when, the 
very day the instant case had been submitted in the court of appeals, the 
Supreme Court handed down a ruling the judges said controlled the 
precise issues before them, an unpublished disposition was thought to 
suffice.276 
Unpublished dispositions are used to send cases back to the lower 
courts to consider an intervening Supreme Court ruling. Where the court 
of appeals ruling requires reversal of the district court’s action so new 
precedent can be considered, matters remain open and publication is not 
necessary.277 However, to the extent the appeals court uses a remand to 
assimilate the new high court case to circuit precedent, publication might 
be in order. Although preliminary examination of Supreme Court rulings 
would add to the law and thus should perhaps be published, non-
publication of a reversal may be excused on the basis that once the 
district court had carried out its application of that preliminary 
discussion, the court of appeals would have another opportunity in a 
subsequent appeal to state the legal rules more fully. 
An early example of such usage is a case dealing with an IRS 
summons for papers held by a person’s attorney. The district court had 
refused to enforce the summons on the basis that the papers remained in 
the taxpayer’s “constructive possession.” Saying that the district court’s 
                                                                                                             
 275 See, e.g., Baucus v. Kidd, No. 72-1082 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1973). 
 276 See Gianone and Van Epps v. A.B.C. of Cal., No. 71-3010 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 
1972), applying California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972). 
 277 See, e.g., Herron ex rel. Herron v. United States, 37 F. App’x 867 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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action had been correct at the time, the panel majority pointed out that 
the Supreme Court had then decided Couch v. United States,278 where 
papers were in an accountant’s possession, and had given “constructive 
possession” a narrower meaning. While the Ninth Circuit judges said 
necessary reexamination of the district court ruling “can best be done by 
the District Court itself,” the judges’ comments left open the possibility 
of quashing the subpoena on the basis of attorney-client privilege. The 
majority acknowledged the difference between papers in the hands of an 
accountant (Couch) and an attorney (the present case); Judge Ely, 
concurring, thought this was enough to sustain the district court “without 
further ado.” That distinction might well have been the basis for 
publishing, as the ruling was not a clear point-for-point application of 
Couch to the Ninth Circuit’s case.279  
In a number of situations when there has been some development 
after the district court ruling, the court of appeals, before issuing a ruling, 
wishes the district court to consider that development. In a challenge to 
zoning of adult entertainment, when the city council had passed a new 
resolution, the Second Circuit remanded for the district court to consider 
the resolution.280 When a district court, in ruling on forum non 
conveniens, had not had available a recent circuit en banc decision to 
guide its evaluation, the appeals court remanded for consideration of the 
factors stated in the en banc ruling and also went on to “highlight some 
other matters for the District Court’s reconsideration on remand.”281 
Given the range of factors the appeals court said should be considered, 
the ruling might have been published as extending the relevant law. The 
fallout from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey282 
also produced some unpublished remands; in a case on which the appeals 
court had previously ruled, the judges found an intervening ruling that 
when a quantity of drugs took a sentence outside the Guidelines range, 
the jury must decide, and thus remanded for resentencing.283 
D. Technical and Procedural Matters 
Technical matters help explain not publishing a number of 
dispositions where the matters were minor and the appeals court could be 
                                                                                                             
 278 409 U.S. 322 (1973). 
 279 Baucus v. Kidd, No. 72-1082 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1973). 
 280 Damach v. City of Hartford, 29 F. App’x 720 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 281 Alnwick v. European Micro Holdings, 29 F. App’x 781, 783 (2d Cir. 2002). 
Included were discovery and the availability of witnesses; language barriers; 
administrative burdens on the court from parallel Dutch litigation; choice of law; the 
essence of the case; and plaintiff’s fraud claims.  See id. 
 282 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 283 See United States v. Williams, 29 F. App’x 656 (2d Cir. 2002). 
2005] Publication (or Not) of Appellate Rulings 101 
explicit about the necessary correction. A number of these cases involved 
sentencing matters. Thus the Second Circuit remanded with directions to 
enter an amended judgment accurately showing the offense of conviction 
and for the district judge to reconsider how to treat unserved home 
detention.284 In the Third Circuit, one remand was to redetermine 
restitution,285 and another, in which the court affirmed a conviction for 
fugitive in possession of a gun, said the sentence could not be enhanced 
for the individual being a fugitive.286 
Procedural matters, where the court said nothing on the merits but 
its action allowed the suit to proceed, accounted for a number of other 
unpublished remands. Thus, the Sixth Circuit let a case move forward 
when it used an unpublished disposition to overturn a ruling on standing 
so that owners of sexually-oriented businesses could challenge zoning 
and licensing ordinance.287 In a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ineffective assistance 
case, the Fourth Circuit remanded for a hearing statutorily mandated 
upon a certain showing.288 The Third Circuit overturned a district court 
dismissal for discovery violations for having done so without findings, 
an abuse of discretion.289 A Second Circuit unpublished reversal order 
overturned the requirement that a plaintiff obtain the court’s permission 
to file suits about his sister’s care, because no notice or opportunity to be 
heard had been provided.290 A similar case involved a district court order 
barring a former wife from future bankruptcy filings without court 
permission, which the Third Circuit held improper for lack of notice and 
for being unnecessarily broad.291 
The Sixth Circuit, vacating and remanding, said the district court 
should rule on qualified immunity without further discovery.292 Where 
the district court had dismissed a Title VII case and had denied counsel 
to the pro se plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit said that the plaintiff had raised a 
question as to when he received an EEOC decision, which would start 
the period for bringing suit, and, because the district court had not 
indicated why plaintiff had been denied counsel, the appeals court could 
not determine whether the judge had abused his discretion.293 And in a 
                                                                                                             
 284 See United States v. Anderson, 29 F. App’x 630 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 285 See United States v. Solano, 29 F. App’x 831 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 286  See United States v. Pritchett, 29 F. App’x 865 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 287 See Bronco’s Entm’t v. Charter Twp. of Van Buren, 29 F. App’x 310 (6th Cir. 
2002). 
 288 See United States v. Hogge, 29 F. App’x 131 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 289 See Ciaverelli v. Stryker Med., 29 F. App’x 832 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 290 See Prince v. Dicker, 29 F. App’x 52 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 291 See Beeghley v. Beeghley, 29 F. App’x 907 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 292 See Collins v. Vill. of New Vienna, 29 F. App’x 359 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 293 Tannous v. Sec’y of Army/Tannous v. Commandant, Def. Language Inst., No. 83-
2635/83-2636, 760 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision). The appeals 
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case on final orders of deportation in which the ruling did not conclude 
the case, the appellate judges found substantial evidence to support 
deportation of the individuals as overstays, but, saying that they had no 
jurisdiction to review the INS district director’s discretionary action 
because the district court was the proper place, they gave petitioner 45 
days to seek relief there.294 
Unpublished dispositions also seem appropriate when the ruling 
brought to the court of appeals is not dispositive or is otherwise 
defective; included would be court of appeals’ dismissals for lack of a 
final judgment or where a case is moot. Other, less recurring, instances 
include a remand for a determination as to whether the offense took place 
in U.S. jurisdiction, and reversals for sentencing not done properly. In 
these instances, and particularly the latter, the case would return to the 
court of appeals for further action, and any law the judges wished to lay 
down could be published then. Still another instance was a sentencing 
case in which the panel affirmed, saying there was no abuse of discretion 
by the district judge; however, as the defendant could still file a motion 
for reconsideration of the sentence, the case was still open.295 
E. Further Action to Follow 
In considering whether decisions reversing or vacating should be 
published, judges might not think publication to be necessary when the 
appellate ruling would not complete the case and further activity could 
be expected in the district court after remand, with the case then likely to 
return to the court of appeals. If the decisions embodying such remands 
contain rulings that develop precedent, then the entire disposition should 
be published, but many memodispos are essentially only another 
procedural step in an incomplete case that provides the court with later 
opportunities to speak to the law. When the court of appeals needs more 
information, particularly as to facts that might underlie a decision, an 
unpublished memorandum may well be used to remand. Thus in a § 1983 
suit against jailers, in which the district court had given summary 
judgment to the defendants on some claims, denied it as to others, and 
dismissed as to still others on believing plaintiff had asked for dismissal, 
the court of appeals reversed “because the record is inadequate for us to 
understand the circumstances surrounding the dismissal” and remanded 
                                                                                                             
court said if on remand the action was found timely filed, the district judge would have to 
reevaluate the counsel request. 
 294 See Mehrnoosh v. INS/Sohirad v. INS, No. 81-7627/81-7646, 755 F.2d 936 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (unpublished table decision). 
 295 United States v. Lopez, No. 73-1099 (9th Cir. June 11, 1973). 
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so the district judge could “make findings as to what occurred.”296 If the 
district court found that the plaintiff had in fact asked for dismissal, said 
the appeals court, the judge “should make a record adequate for this 
court’s review.”297 This ruling indicates how the court of appeals can 
simultaneously seek more information and, more than obliquely, criticize 
the district court. 
Another type of case in which further district court action would 
occur was one in which a preliminary injunction had been granted or 
denied, because the district court’s ruling on a permanent injunction 
would also likely be appealed. One can see explicit recognition of this 
possibility of later appeals court work when a panel used an unpublished 
memorandum to affirm a district court’s denial of a preliminary 
injunction: “The substantive questions presented can await decision in a 
final judgment of the district court.”298 And such a disposition was also 
used to clarify the status quo ante which a preliminary injunction was 
intended preserve, when the court of appeals upheld denial of a motion to 
dissolve or modify a preliminary injunction.299 However, in affirming 
denial of a preliminary injunction, the judges came close to a definitive 
ruling when they said that plaintiffs had not shown they would probably 
prevail on the merits in their challenge to double-celling in state prison, 
but they still used only an unpublished memorandum even though 
change would be unlikely on appeal from the merits, particularly as the 
judges said they ‘were impressed by [then District] Judge Rymer’s 
careful review of the conditions at CMC and her surprise inspection of 
the facility.”300 
Additional instances in which further action would take place in the 
lower courts are remands for an evidentiary hearing,301 to clear up 
matters,302 or to determine attorney fees, for example, when the court 
affirmed on the principal legal question but reversed or vacated attorney 
                                                                                                             
 296 See Anderson v. Carey, No. 84-4243, 787 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished 
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 297  Id. 
 298 Johnson v. Orr, No. 85-2017, 787 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table 
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 302 See, e.g., Kuchuris v. Harper, No. 72-2184 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 1973). 
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fee awards.303 Other examples are remands to deal with improper 
sentencing. When a conviction is affirmed but there a problem with the 
sentence, perhaps because of a misapplication of an element of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, judges tend to remand and to use an unpublished 
ruling to do so. Thus when a judge believed he lacked authority to depart 
downward, and the court of appeals, distinguishing on the basis of an 
earlier case between the lack of authority and not using discretion to 
depart, said that the judge’s belief was erroneous, the panel vacated and 
remanded “to give the sentencing court an opportunity to exercise its 
discretion.”304 Another reason for using an unpublished ruling is that the 
case before the appellate court would also not be complete. 
The court of appeals also used unpublished dispositions when 
further work was required on an aspect of an immigration case.305 Thus 
the judges denied a petition for review of denial of withholding of 
deportation but remanded concerning the denial of voluntary departure, 
because the only reason the Board of Immigration Appeals had given in 
support of the denial was inadequate. The BIA had not mentioned that 
the alien had the means to depart, and “[This court] cannot affirm the 
BIA’s decision on a basis other than actually relied upon [below].”306 
Where the court of appeals remands for an evidentiary hearing of some 
sort, an unpublished ruling should suffice; an example would be a 
remand for an evidentiary hearing as to the defendant’s understanding at 
the time he waived trial.307 However, publication might be the better 
option if the judges develop the law at some length.308 
In a more complicated case in which a memorandum disposition 
seemed appropriate because further action was necessary, the court of 
appeals reversed and remanded for a hearing in which more facts would 
be obtained.309 Here the district court had summarily denied a motion to 
set aside a guilty plea, without saying whether the ruling was on the 
merits or was based on jurisdictional problems. Nor was it clear whether 
a government motion to augment the record had been granted and thus 
                                                                                                             
 303 See, for example, Alyeska Ski Corp. v. United States, No. 72-1539 (9th Cir. Sept. 
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a $500 allowance for attorney fees without prejudice to renewal of the request and then 
remanded the case for transfer to the Court of Claims. 
 304 United States v. Sims, 927 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). 
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was part of the pleadings; if it had been included, the defendant had not 
had an opportunity to rebut new allegations. The court of appeals said 
defendant had included sufficient facts to require a hearing and then 
observed: 
The present record raises a disputed issue of fact regarding Fey’s 
guilt of a crime and his knowledge of the requirements of the law 
that must first be resolved by the trial court. An evidentiary 
hearing on Fey’s motion is necessary to establish the facts which 
caused him to conclude that he was guilty of a violation . . . .310 
It was important, in “the interests of justice,” for the defendant to have an 
opportunity to have the district court consider his constitutional claim, 
and if the district judge were to find an inadequate basis for holding an 
evidentiary hearing, “the district court is requested to set forth the basis 
for its ruling on this issue.” Because the appeals court said that 
defendant’s motion should have been treated as a request for a writ of 
error coram nobis, to the extent that this ruling spoke to situations in 
which coram nobis might be appropriate, publication might have added 
to circuit precedent.311 
Why publish a remand, particularly if the lower court’s decision 
might change the complexion of the case, as when the court of appeals 
ruled that the district judge had not committed an abuse of discretion but 
the defendant could still move to reconsider his sentence,312 so the case 
thus was still open. However, if the appeals court may wish to provide 
guidance, both to the court that will receive the remand to aid it in 
resolving matters likely to be raised in the continued proceedings and to 
other courts now, a published ruling would be better. Another ruling not 
ending a case was a reversal of a district court’s dismissal of a § 1983 
case by a pro se prisoner against state prison officials for seizure of legal 
documents for pending cases.313 After stating that pro se complaints were 
to be dismissed as frivolous only if they lacked an arguable basis, the 
court explained how plaintiff’s allegations, which did not lack an 
“arguable basis in fact,” might if proved show constitutional violations, 
and also found another claim to have been stated with sufficient 
particularity. Although using a memorandum disposition, the court took 
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a paragraph to explain a Ninth Circuit case with circumstances like those 
in the present one.314 
F. Return After Remand 
If unpublished dispositions are appropriate where further action is 
to follow, it is also true that a case returning to the court of appeals after 
a remand for some further action may not require publication, as the 
lower court’s ruling often involves application of the legal principles set 
forth in the court of appeals’ remand. When the court of appeals has 
published its ruling remanding, the post-remand appeal is often handled 
by unpublished memorandum — to deal with follow-up matters.315 That 
the appellate court affirms when such cases return on post-remand 
appeal, as it most frequently does in an yet another unpublished 
disposition, would seem to show that the instruction was adequate to 
allow the lower court to “get it right.”   
One reason why dispositions in post-remand appeals are not 
published is that these appeals are often handled by a different panel 
from the one which handled the earlier appeal, and the later panel’s 
judges may have a different view of what needs to be published. More 
basic, however, is that if the court has set forth in the published opinion 
the legal rules the district court is to apply, on post-remand appeal the 
question is quite likely to be limited to whether the district court has 
properly applied those rules, and such application is likely to be fact-
specific, making the disposition even less a candidate for publication. In 
criminal cases where the appeals court has already upheld the conviction 
and the remand was only for resentencing, the post-remand appeal quite 
likely will be limited to that question. Publication is not seen as 
necessary in such cases, often involving factual questions of application 
of the Sentencing guidelines, particularly where the sentence is upheld. 
Thus unpublished rulings are used when the court deals with elements of 
a case that “follow on” prior action. 
If the initial remand order is unpublished, the ruling in any follow-
up appeal will usually also be unpublished. One reason is that 
affirmances are likely in post-remand appeals, and unpublished 
dispositions are more likely when the court affirms. Where the initial 
remand was not published, only infrequently does the post-remand 
appeal produce a published disposition. Given the upward trend in 
unpublished dispositions over time, one would not expect many initially 
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unpublished dispositions to result in published opinions upon appeal 
from the remand. If a case stood a certain chance of being published 
when it was first heard, by the time it returned to the court after remand, 
the likelihood of publication would be less, all things being equal. In 
memorandum dispositions of appeals from remands, roughly twice as 
many came from initial remands that had been published. Thus, cases 
initially published but unpublished on post-remand appeal are more 
frequent than unpublished initial appeals also unpublished on post-
remand appeal. 
G. Sending a Message 
Use of an unpublished disposition may be a way to soften a 
reversal. There are instances when, particularly where other criteria do 
not seem to require publication, the court may intentionally use an 
unpublished disposition to call some failings to the attention of a judge or 
prosecutor quietly, particularly if the judge is otherwise well-respected or 
the prosecutor has not previously caused problems. This may be done 
when judges have erred but where the problem does not seem systemic, 
as the latter would make publication more appropriate; lawyers can be 
chided for misbehavior in the same way. In short, the court can 
administer some discipline but, by leaving the disposition unpublished, 
can soften the blow in correcting an errant district judge or out-of-line 
prosecutor. The judges thus send a “message” without hanging the 
official “out to dry” by including the criticism in a published opinion. In 
a recent reversal for prosecutorial misconduct, one of the judges, noting 
that “publication may be a career damaging event for the prosecutor,” 
commented to his colleagues that the prosecutor needed to be called on 
what the judge referred to as “pettifogging” — “but not necessarily in 
public.”316 
Although “messages” are more often negative, they can be either 
negative or positive. An example of the latter is the statement, on the 
appeal of a complicated patent case that resulted in a ten-page 
memorandum disposition, “We conclude the trial court tried well a 
difficult case, carefully analyzed the evidence and reached a result 
consistent with the law as announced in this circuit.”317 The court may 
sometimes convey that the district judge “got it right” even when it is 
reversing the judge’s decision. Although a reversal is, of course, usually 
a negative message, it might be accompanied by this positive message if 
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intervening law led to the reversal. Thus when, subsequent to a 
conviction for an ammunition offense, the Ninth Circuit had said that 
specific intent had to be shown, thus requiring reversal of the conviction, 
the panel said, “We note on behalf of the District Court that the first 
impression decision” in that Ninth Circuit case “was entered subsequent 
to the trial and entry of the judgment of conviction and sentence 
herein.”318 If an intervening Supreme Court ruling means that a lower 
court ruling must be reexamined and the district judge, a distinguished 
one, had done a fine job, the court of appeals would not feel the need to 
reverse in a published opinion.319 One judge observed in an interview 
that if the court of appeals was going to reverse a lower court because of 
an intervening Supreme Court or court of appeals decision and the 
district judge had “got it right” in deciding the case initially, it was only 
humane and courteous for the court of appeals to note explicitly that the 
judge had applied correctly the law in effect at the time of that 
decision.320 
If positive views could be conveyed even in reversals, negative 
comments could be made even when the district judge was being 
affirmed. At times, this occurred as to sentencing, when the appeals court 
might suggest that a sentence was too harsh, even though valid. In a 
particularly obvious example, a panel affirming a sentence upon a 
conviction for importing aliens because “The sentence imposed is within 
the statutory limit,” added a comment after the ritual “Judgment is 
affirmed,” in which it said: 
We note . . . while recogniz[ing] that sentencing is within the 
discretion of the trial court, the sentences imposed seem harsh in 
view of the nature of the offense. The defendant’s offense cannot 
be condoned; it calls for punishment.  We suggest that the 
District Court seriously consider exercising its power under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure No. 35 to reduce the 
sentence imposed.321 
While appellate judges correcting an errant district judge may 
soften the blow of a reversal by leaving the disposition unpublished, on 
the other hand, they may want to send a message about disliked practices 
which do not necessarily lead to reversals of convictions and hence will 
publish the opinion in order to “get the word out” about a particular 
                                                                                                             
 318 United States v. Morales, No. 76-1310, 546 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1976) (unpublished 
table decision). 
 319 See, e.g., Baucus v. Kidd, No. 72-1082 (9th Cir. Dec. 17 1973). 
 320  See supra note 21. 
 321 United States v. Ortiz-Martinez, No. 76-2189, 546 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(unpublished table decision). 
2005] Publication (or Not) of Appellate Rulings 109 
practice. In such situations, an unpublished disposition might not have 
been efficacious before such dispositions were available on-line or in 
Federal Appendix. However, particularly in the early years of 
unpublished dispositions, when there were fewer of them, a published 
opinion might not have been needed to get a point across to others 
through a reversal or criticism because one could assume that other 
judges would read them, and, as U.S. Attorneys were thought to collect 
and reach such dispositions, perhaps they would have “heard” those 
directed at prosecutors. Heavier caseload may have altered that situation, 
but in any event, if the unpublished disposition did not bring change, 
later opinions could be published to convey the appeals court’s view 
about a particular practice. 
In one instance, from another circuit, the court sent a message both 
to a judge and to a lawyer, when the presiding judge delivered the 
opinion from the bench, after which it was transcribed and released as an 
unpublished ruling.322 Thus the lawyer would have been present to “get 
the message” with others also hearing it. Chief Judge Becker was quite 
blunt: “we will surely not pin any medals on plaintiff’s counsel for 
celerity or diligence in getting the material to the defense. She acted here 
more like the tortoise than the hare, but ultimately she did get them what 
they needed.”323 In the same case, in which the court reversed and 
remanded a district court’s dismissal as an abuse of discretion for having 
been taken without findings and without weighing relevant factors, Judge 
Becker, naming the judge, said: “Judge [J. Curtis] Joyner is a very able 
member of the District Bench, a man whom we all admire and respect. 
But just as it was said of the great Homer, that Homer nods, in this case 
Judge Joyner nodded and acted a little precipitously.”324 
The entire panel can send the message, but it can also be sent in a 
judge’s separate writing, for example, a concurrence adding to the 
majority’s opinion. For example, in a Third Circuit case, Judge Becker, 
pointing to problems with the trial judge’s post-trial opinion on motions 
and to his inconsistencies, first complemented the trial judge as “an able, 
experienced, and conscientious jury,”325 but then said: “In this high 
profile case, perhaps in an effort to tie down every loose end, he may 
have said too much. In another sense, however, in terms of not clearing 
up the issues that trouble me he may have said too little,”326 but that 
might have stemmed from the defendant not raising issues at trial. 
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H. Judges 
At times the “message” need not be very strong, and it may be less 
a “message” to “shape up” than a note of mild criticism. Thus, in an 
employment case involving payment of pension to individuals rehired in 
different positions after the termination for age, a panel observed, “Our 
review is somewhat hampered by the district court’s failure to prepare 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.”327 As this judge was highly 
respected and regularly sat with the Ninth Circuit, the judges did not find 
the need to administer public embarrassment in a published opinion. 
Another instance of a slight knuckle-rapping of a judge came when 
a panel reversed a summary judgment because the plaintiff had not been 
provided a real opportunity to respond to the defendant’s motion.328 As 
the judges observed, 
The district court should not have granted summary judgment 
against an incarcerated prisoner when the record showed that the 
motion for summary judgment had not been sent to the prisoner. 
The court could have ascertained the reason for the plaintiff’s 
failure to respond by examining its own records. 
One element of a “message” is criticism. We see this in a 
bankruptcy case involving the transfer of mining claims.329 After a 
bankruptcy court finding of a joint venture was reversed by the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), further action in the bankruptcy 
court and the court of appeals led ultimately to affirmance of the BAP’s 
ruling. The bankruptcy court then issued supplemental orders, 
confirming sanctions and the property transfer. In this procedurally 
complex matter, the court of appeals then used another memorandum 
disposition to reverse the BAP for misapplying the appeals court’s earlier 
decision, which it said was the law of the case only on the joint venture 
issue. While conceding “some logic to the BAP’s conclusion” that the 
transfer of mining claims should be reversed and the joint venture 
finding fell together, the Ninth Circuit said, “However, this Court could 
not have made its finding more plain . . . .” And the judges added, “The 
BAP is wholly without authority to ‘correct’ what it apparently perceived 
as our misunderstanding of its prior decisions.” The court of appeals also 
said that the BAP ruling on the sanctions “exceeded the directives of our 
judgment” because “sanctionable violations” would stand even if the 
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violated orders were subsequently reversed.330 Here, we see the court of 
appeals “woodshedding” the BAP with less publicity than a published 
opinion would have produced, although the procedural complexity of this 
case, which made it quite fact-heavy, would have also tilted the court 
toward non-publication, which had been used when the case had earlier 
appeared on appeal. 
In another case, one of four elements addressed was “Judicial 
Misconduct” involving the judge’s questioning of witnesses.331 Saying it 
had “reviewed each of the judge’s comments set forth in appellant’s 
briefs,” the Ninth Circuit found some “ill-advised and inappropriate.” 
However, in part because the judge had told the jury that his comments 
were not evidence, the court found that no comments “reach the level of 
bias or prejudice required by this court to support an assertion that the 
trial judge’s conduct affected the jury’s ability to reach an impartial 
decisions.”332 As the appeals court did not reverse, this was a case in 
which the court seemed to send a message through its languages. 
However, as the district judge was one against whom repeated 
complaints of misconduct had been filed in the judicial discipline system 
– the judge later was precluded from hearing certain types of cases – one 
wonders whether anything was served by keeping the criticism 
unpublished. 
The court of appeals did publish its criticism of another judge with 
whom the circuit had had to deal a number of times. The court ruled that 
the conduct of the judge – who, the appellant claimed, “took over the 
examination of witnesses in an excessive and abusive manner, 
denigrating the efforts of counsel to put on the plaintiff’s case, and 
excluded proferred testimony, in a rude and domineering manner”333 – 
did not deny a fair trial nor make the judge’s factual findings erroneous. 
However, the court, while saying that the trial “was not a travesty,” the 
judges said it “would not serve as an example for the training of new 
judges,” and, criticizing the judge while upholding his rulings, said, 
“Intemperate bench behavior does not require reversal merely to chastise 
a judge if the judgment appealed from was one supported by the law and 
facts.”334 
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Of course, the court of appeals may further indicate its displeasure 
by reversing a district judge directly by remanding with instructions to 
enter a specific judgment instead of remanding for further proceedings. 
Thus in a case involving a breach of contract, where the district judge 
made a clearly erroneous finding and was wrong on the state law issue 
involved, the court of appeals, reversing, gave judgment directly to one 
of the parties, and the court was also critical of the judge.335 Another 
such case was a blunt reversal of a summary judgment granted to an 
insurance company in a third party complaint for indemnity under 
investment trust insurance policies.336 Reversing, holding that the notice 
period should have been tolled, and remanding only so summary 
judgment could be given to appellant, the court of appeals said the 
district court’s analysis was “without merit” and indicated that the 
judge’s action “imposes fault on the appellant for the precise act against 
which he insured; appellant could not have given notice of potential 
claims of which he had no notice.”337 Leading to an unpublished result 
may have been the fact that this case involved interpretation of state law 
and the high respect the court otherwise had for the judge, William Gray, 
of the Central District of California. 
In still another case, the appeals court indicated its annoyance at the 
district court and, reversing for the second time, took action itself rather 
than leaving it to the trial judge.338 The court had earlier reversed the 
district court’s conclusion that a joint venture existed as well as a finding 
as to an individual’s degree of negligence, remanding for redetermination 
of the latter and of economic damages.339 When the case returned to the 
court of appeals, the judges said, “On remand . . . the district court 
apparently misread our instructions and adopted a completely new 
finding of fact and conclusion of law,” and had again found a joint 
venture, although “Our earlier memorandum . . . foreclosed this 
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possibility.”340 They went on to say, “By altering its earlier findings and 
conclusions on this point the district court exceeded our mandate.” Then, 
pointing out that Ninth Circuit cases set out how to calculate damages in 
wrongful death Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) cases, the judges said, 
“The district court here did not specify how it applied the English 
factors.” Observing that “[o]rdinarily, we would remand on that ground 
alone,” the court took matters into its own hands: “There has already 
been a remand in this case, however, and we conclude that judicial 
economy and the interests of the parties will be best served if we proceed 
to the merits of the damages issues.” Thus the court was conveying that it 
wished the matter done right rather than have the district judge — the 
strong-willed Manuel Real of the Central District of California, with 
whom the court of appeals had prior experience — again make a hash of 
matters. The appeals court did accept some of Judge Real’s findings but 
found others were incorrect and still others “inadequate and clearly 
erroneous,” and the panel specified the damages to be awarded.341 
The court’s exasperation with some judges can increase to the point 
where it is unwilling to limit itself to an unpublished memorandum, but 
publishes a ruling to make clear its displeasure with the district judge. A 
judge’s failure to “get it” upon being reversed is one such situation. In a 
housing discrimination suit by African-Americans, the district judge had 
denied compensatory damages for humiliation for emotional distress. 
Reversing upon finding clear error for the failure to award these 
damages, the court of appeals said such matters could be the basis for 
damages and noted that plaintiffs had provided considerable evidence 
that would support such an award.342 On remand, the district judge 
ordered damages of only $250 and excused the defendants’ behavior. 
Again reversing and remanding, the Ninth Circuit said, 
We are disappointed that this case is again before us. We hoped 
our previous opinion would lead to an appropriate award of 
compensatory damages or a settlement by the parties. 
Unfortunately, in light of the de minimis damage award, we must 
again reverse for clear error and remand for an award consistent 
with the purpose of § 1982 and the discrimination cited in 
plaintiffs’ brief.343 
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That, however, was not all, as the opinion ended with the statement, 
“Although we decline to set a damage award ourselves, the two appeals 
in this relatively simple case indicate that some direction is necessary,” 
because “the disregard of recent relevant precedent has caused an 
unseemly delay of some five years and has wasted judicial resources.”344 
The minimum damages award was then spelled out, although the opinion 
said the district judge “may, of course, award more after reviewing the 
authorities cited above,”345 and the judges also made clear that attorneys 
fees should be awarded. 
I. Prosecutors 
Instead of imposing sanctions on prosecutors or referring a matter 
for discipline, appellate judges, even when not overturning a conviction, 
may convey unhappiness with the government’s position and also 
provide a “heads-up” as to proper practice. One instance involved a 
prosecutor, who had engaged in “hammering down the credibility of the 
defendant” and, when the defendant had no duty to produce evidence, 
had raised the question why defendant had not produced a Puerto Rican 
birth certificate. Calling the comment “a blunder,” the court said, “If the 
case were at all close, we might have to call it an unconstitutional 
shifting of the burden of proof,” but instead, given other evidence, the 
judges were willing to let it go as “practically a textbook example of 
harmless error.”346 In that way, they sent a message. 
A message was also clearly conveyed in comments on a case 
challenge to an affidavit used to support a search warrant. Saying “that in 
this case no reason whatsoever appears why the ‘individual’ referred to 
in the affidavit should not have been named and identified,” the judges 
observed, “why law enforcement officers insist on being so obtuse in the 
preparation of affidavits to support search warrants, in view of the 
continuing attacks on their sufficiency, is a policy that cannot readily be 
understood.”347 
In another case, a judge who was himself a former U.S. Attorney 
used a concurring opinion to send a stronger message. The court, said the 
judge, had “alerted” both defendant and government “to be prepared to 
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argue the applicability of [a case] to the facts of the case.” When the 
government failed to do so, the court was “compelled” to reverse.348 Said 
Judge Hawkins, delivering the message, “Perhaps the arguments were 
not there to be made. . . . If, on the other hand, the arguments were there 
to be made, it is most unfortunate for this is a very serious crime and it 
merited the government’s most serious attention.”349 
In still another unpublished disposition, the court accepted filing of 
a superceding indictment in the face of “misconduct in the grand jury 
process,” but criticized the government,350 saying, “The government’s 
behavior here falls significantly below the high standards we expect, and 
with very few exceptions receive, from the United States Attorney’s 
Office,” and adding, “Had the government acted more diligently and 
expeditiously, it may not have been necessary to go a different grand jury 
for the superceding indictment.” The judges then talked about actions 
that left “something to be desired” or were “equally disquieting,” and 
ended by saying that the agent’s “misstatement of a damning confession” 
by one defendant directly “represents behavior at odds with the 
American system of justice.” The court has also shown that it can 
criticize not only a prosecutor’s improper action at trial but also the 
government’s initiating of the case itself: “We fail to understand why 
prosecutorial discretion was exercised to bring this petty offense 
[involving a credit card] into the heavily overburdened federal courts” 
when state law provided a sufficient basis for prosecution.”351 
While sending strong messages in unpublished dispositions might 
keep it out of someone’s official file, regularly placing such messages in 
memodispos may fail to send a broader message to the law enforcement 
community which might assist in keeping it accountable. Similarly, one 
might ask if these “messages,” or expressions of exasperation at lawyers 
in private practice,352 reach their intended audience, much less have a 
noticeable effect. One might ask that same question with respect to the 
court of appeals’ ruling in a complicated suit to collect part of a 
judgment that also entailed claims of fraud upon the court. Although the 
judges had discussed among themselves publishing a later ruling should 
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certain negative facts be found on remand, the court used an unpublished 
disposition for a message to the lawyers. After an initial affirmance by 
published opinion,353 a company in the proceedings sought to have the 
judgment against it set aside because of evidence it claimed revealed 
fraud on the court. In overturning summary judgment for defendants, the 
author wrote to his colleagues on the panel, “This draft does not accuse 
the two allegedly mendacious lawyers by name. That can be saved for 
publication if necessary after a court having nisi prius powers decides 
that somebody lied to a judge, and that the judge believed the lies, and 
then was thereby induced to enter a judgment by mistake.”354 As he 
observed in the disposition, “If no such evidence [that a lawyer lied to 
the court] is produced, the suggestion of professional misconduct by one 
or more lawyers will be put to rest.”355 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article presents an examination, primarily descriptive, of 
appellate court publication practices, with primary attention given to 
more than thirty years’ use of unpublished dispositions by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with a focus on the court’s use of its 
own criteria and other non-formal facts that affect publication. 
Certain findings are of particular note. One is that the court of 
appeals reverses or in some other way disturbs the decision being 
reviewed far more frequently in cases with published opinions than in 
those receiving unpublished memorandums; the same is true with respect 
to those cases in which a judge writes a concurrence or dissent. With the 
increase in the proportion of cases receiving non-precedential 
dispositions, those which are published are disproportionately those in 
which the court of appeals disturbs the lower court’s or agency’s 
judgment and in which internal disagreement is manifest in concurring 
and dissenting opinions. Thus published opinions in Federal Reporter 
are an increasingly segregated set of cases with important policy 
content,356 through which the court of appeals performs its law-making 
function while its error-correction work is heavily relegated to 
unpublished memorandum dispositions. That unpublished rulings contain 
many judgments disturbing lower court and agency rulings suggests that 
they all are not simple, routine, “cookie-cutter” cases. 
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 Most assuredly there are unpublished dispositions the publication 
of which seems either necessary or at least strongly suggested. Such 
cases can provide grist for the mill of those who approach court of 
appeals’ publication practices with a critical eye or opposition to the use 
of any unpublished rulings and who build their argument from egregious 
anecdote rather than a broader view. However, when the great bulk of 
these rulings are examined, on the whole there seem quite few about 
which non-publication can be questioned. 
For many, perhaps most, dispositions, not publishing seems 
explainable in terms of the courts’ formal criteria, which thus can be said 
to have an effect. However, there are also instances when, viewed in 
terms of the criteria, failure to publish is problematic. One would perhaps 
not expect it to be otherwise when application of the rules rests almost 
solely with the judges. Yet, despite the obvious effect of judges’ 
discretion, the judges are definitely constrained by the criteria and by 
other norms which have developed over time but which are not 
incorporated in the formal publication criteria. These elements take their 
force from interaction among the judges and from parties’ occasional 
requests to redesignate unpublished dispositions as opinions. The 
presence of rough edges in the system is hardly surprising, given the 
partial indeterminacy of the process by which it is decided to publish or 
not and a decentralized process of guideline implementation, where the 
judges exercise discretion in applying publication guidelines and there is 
no Publication Czar to make initial determinations or to reverse judges’ 
publication decisions. Within this context, one is indeed struck by the 
extent to which, overall, the court has followed, or complied with, the 
criteria rather than departed from the norms. 
 
